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THE FRACTAL GEOMETRY OF INVENTION 
Alan L. Durham* 
Abstract: Fractals are geometric objects of inexhaustible detail. Fractal 
structures have been found in the contours of mountain ranges, the pat-
terns of veins on a leaf, and the fluctuations of the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average. The endeavor of inventing new technologies, consisting of a hi-
erarchical network of practical inquiries, exhibits fractal properties as 
well. Among these are multiplicity, latency, and self-similarity. Multiplicity 
means that a single inventive idea may lead to an immense and diverse 
array of technological artifacts. Latency means that the potential of an in-
ventive idea to yield practical embodiments only reveals itself in time, and 
may never be fully known. Self-similarity means that invention is not scale-
dependent; in other words, breakthroughs and refinements may be diffi-
cult, in principle, to distinguish. Invention, as a whole, resembles an ever-
expanding fractal island of promontory upon promontory. Patent law as-
signs a particular inventor legal rights to a portion of that intricate coast-
line. The fractal properties of multiplicity, latency, and self-similarity con-
tribute to many of the perennial difficulties in patent law, including fixing 
the meaning of claim language, properly applying the enablement and 
written description requirements, and identifying “abstract ideas” that 
cannot be patented. Understanding the fractal properties of invention is 
an important step in addressing these issues. 
Introduction 
 A fundamental question in patent-related disputes is, “What did 
the patentee (or patent applicant) invent?”1 The claims of the patent 
define the invention, in so far as “the invention” means the sphere of 
activity reserved exclusively to the patentee.2 The disclosures of the pa-
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1 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 193–94 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The 
starting point in the proper adjudication of patent litigation is an understanding of what 
the inventor claims to have discovered.”); In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 839 (Fed. Cir. 1989) 
(“In all instances, this critical question must be answered: ‘What did applicants invent?’”). 
2 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“It is a 
‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention to which 
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tent specification describe and enable the invention, in so far as “the 
invention” means the patentee’s substantive contribution to the art.3 
Before it can be claimed or described, “the invention” begins as an idea 
formed in the mind of the inventor.4 In a perfect world, a world in 
which the patent system operated as a smooth-running and well-
regulated machine, “the invention” would be a single thing—one thing 
conceived, reduced to practice, disclosed, and claimed. The reality is 
more complicated, and the multi-faceted nature of “the invention” in 
our world is the source of much tension, friction, and potential mis-
haps. Partly this is a problem of communication. As the U.S. Supreme 
Court has observed, the shortcomings of vocabulary produce “idea 
gaps” when one translates a conception into the language of a claim.5 
Similar problems may impair the completeness of the patent disclosure. 
This Article suggests, however, that the source of the difficulty in pin-
ning down “the invention” is even more fundamental, and begins in 
the nature of invention itself. 
 Few inventions are singular entities, unconnected to broader net-
works of technological advancement.6 Most inventions are variations on 
what has come before and have the potential to generate further varia-
tions or refinements.7 Whether it is the work of an individual re-
searcher or the community of all researchers, invention is a complex 
web of questions and answers. Each insight may suggest a host of new 
paths to follow in the search for technological solutions to the needs of 
mankind. One might visualize invention as an ever-expanding island, 
                                                                                                                      
the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’” (citations omitted) (quoting Innova/Pure 
Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004))); see 
also Jeffrey A Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement, 23 
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1141, 1145 (2008) (“In modern parlance, the claim, ‘the invention,’ 
and ‘the patent’ are essentially synonymous.”). 
3 See 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1 (2006), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. 
L. No. 112-29, § 4(c), (e), 125 Stat. 284, 296–97 (2011) (effective Sept. 16, 2012) (“The 
specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and 
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any 
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, . . . to make and use the same . . . .”). 
4 See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 60 (1998) (“The primary meaning of the word 
‘invention” in the Patent Act unquestionably refers to the inventor’s conception . . . .”). 
5 See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002) 
(quoting Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967)) (“A verbal 
portrayal is usually an afterthought written to satisfy the requirements of patent law. This 
conversion of machine to words allows for unintended idea gaps which cannot be satisfac-
torily filled.”). 
6 See George Basalla, The Evolution of Technology 208–09 (1988) (stating that 
“every novel artifact has an antecedent” and is “related to what has been made before”). 
7 See id. 
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each advancement pushing out a new headland, itself the root of newer 
promontories, each generation mirroring the last, ad infinitum. 
 A mathematician would recognize that island as a Koch island—a 
species of fractal.8 A fractal is a geometric figure of inexhaustible de-
tail.9 The closer one examines a fractal, the more detail one finds.10 
Structures with fractal properties can be found in nature—in the con-
tours of an actual island, for example.11 A map might approximate the 
shape of the island, but would inevitably miss twists and turns too small 
to be depicted.12 A larger scale map could correct those deficiencies, 
but only up to a point.13 Closer examination of a coastline always re-
veals more detail—twists upon twists, turns upon turns.14 
 Certain properties are typical of fractals, and the real-world objects 
that mimic them. One of these properties I call “multiplicity,” in refer-
ence to that inexhaustible supply of detail. A second property I call “la-
tency,” in reference to the fact that the fractal details reveal themselves 
only on examination—an examination that can never be completed. A 
third property, well-known in the field of fractals, is “self-similarity.”15 A 
fractal is self-similar when its structure appears the same at any scale.16 
These properties are all characteristics of invention. Invention leads to 
a seemingly inexhaustible supply of technological solutions, even to 
comparatively simple problems.17 The potential of an inventive insight 
to produce such solutions does not reveal itself immediately; further 
investigation typically reveals more paths to explore. To some degree, 
inventive contributions are also self-similar. A refinement many steps 
removed from one path-breaking advancement may seem, in its own 
context, just as fundamental. 
 These properties underlie the difficulty of defining the invention 
to which a patentee is legally entitled. If inventions are, as a rule, only 
promontories on a larger continent, and themselves the source of elab-
                                                                                                                      
8 See Benoit B. Mandelbrot, The Fractal Geometry of Nature 42–43 (rev. ed. 
1983) (illustrating and explaining how to create a Koch island). 
9 See id. at 7–9 (discussing how fractals reveal infinite complexity as they are magnified). 
10 See id. 
11 Id. at 1, 25. 
12 Id. at 25. 
13 See id. at 26 (noting that the measured length of a coastline will be more accurate as 
smaller increments are used to measure it, but this measurement can never be entirely 
accurate). 
14 Mandelbrot, supra note 8, at 26. 
15 Id. at 34 (defining “self-similar” as “when each piece of a shape is geometrically simi-
lar to the whole”). 
16 See id. 
17 See infra notes 130–209 and accompanying text. 
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orations to come, to what territory is an inventor entitled to stake a 
claim? One can define a fractal promontory so as to distinguish it from 
the remainder of the figure, but one cannot know all that it contains, 
much less describe its contents to anyone else. This tension fuels some of 
the most stubborn problems in patent law. 
 Part I of this Article provides a basic primer on the subject of frac-
tals, with particular emphasis on the Koch island and the much more 
elaborate Mandelbrot set.18 Part I also explains how researchers have 
discovered fractal properties in many real-world places, including in the 
branching inquiries of the common law.19 Part II discusses the fractal 
properties of invention, both as an individual endeavor and as a collec-
tive enterprise.20 Part II also explains how one technological variation 
typically leads to further variations, generating a complex structure 
marked by the fractal properties of multiplicity, latency, and self-
similarity.21 Part III explores the role of those fractal properties in sev-
eral areas of patent law, including claim interpretation, the enablement 
and written description requirements, and the prohibition on patent-
ing abstract ideas.22 Part III also argues that the ever-receding details of 
a fractal network create many of the analytical problems that beset 
those aspects of the patent system, including the difficulty of identifying 
“the invention.”23 
I. Fractal Oddities and Their Real-World Analogs 
 “Fractal” is a term coined by Benoit Mandelbrot, the mathemati-
cian who pioneered the study of fractals half a century ago.24 Mandel-
brot’s 1983 book The Fractal Geometry of Nature collects some of his more 
accessible writings in the field. Fractals are easiest to explain by example, 
and one of the simplest fractals to envision is a Koch island, also known 
as a Koch snowflake.25 Section I.A describes the Koch island.26 Section 
                                                                                                                      
18 See infra notes 24–129 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 60–84 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 130–212 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 130–212 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 213–461 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 213–461 and accompanying text. 
24 John Briggs, Fractals: The Patterns of Chaos: Discovering a New Aesthetic of 
Art, Science, and Nature 22 (1992). The term “fractal” apparently refers to the non-
integer dimensions encountered in fractal geometry. See Mandelbrot, supra note 8, at 15. It 
may also suggest the “fractured” appearance of the “broken, wrinkled, and uneven shapes” 
that often appear. Briggs, supra, at 22. 
25 See Mandelbrot, supra note 8, at 42–43 (providing illustrations of Koch islands or 
snowflakes). 
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I.B describes a more complex fractal, the Mandelbrot set.27 Section I.C 
provides examples of fractals that are found in nature and everyday 
life.28 Section I.D explains some of the properties of fractals.29 Section 
I.E shows how those fractal properties relate to the study of law.30 
A. The Koch Island 
 To construct a Koch island, begin with an equilateral triangle.31 
Next, at the center of each side of that triangle, attach a smaller equi-
lateral triangle, jutting outward from the center of the larger triangle.32 
Make the length of each side of the smaller triangle one-third the 
length of the sides of the original triangle, so the figure now resembles 
a six-pointed Star of David.33 Next, give each of these triangular points 
the same treatment.34 In other words, at the middle of each exposed 
side, attach a still smaller outward-jutting triangle.35 At this stage, the 
figure begins to resemble a snowflake, each point of the Star of David 
now multiplied to three.36 Now continue the process indefinitely.37 As 
each point or peninsula acquires its own smaller protuberances, the 
edge of the figure assumes ever more elaborate contours.38 A true 
Koch island is the product of an infinite number of iterations.39 
                                                                                                                     
 A Koch island has curious properties. It is not, by any means, infi-
nite in area.40 If the Koch island illustrated in Mandelbrot’s book were 
elaborated to an endless degree of complexity, it would still fit com-
fortably on the page.41 The length of the perimeter is another matter.42 
 
26 See infra notes 31–50 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 51–59 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 60–84 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 85–100 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 101–129 and accompanying text. 






37 Mandelbrot, supra note 8, at 42–43. 
38 See id. (illustrating the results of this process). 
39 See id. at 42 (instructing one who constructs a Koch island to continue this process 
“ad infinitum”). 
40 See id. at 42–43 (describing a Koch island as exhibiting “inner infinity,” as the addi-
tional augmentations are always squeezed into the form’s existing boundaries, which are 
limited by polygons connecting the points created in the previous stage). 
41 See id. 
42 See id. at 25–26 (explaining through the example of a coastline how the perimeter of 
a Koch island should be considered infinite). 
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A simple way to measure the perimeter of a figure is to take a straight 
measuring rod of length e and march it around the edges, in the end 
multiplying e by the number of times (L) the measuring rod fits.43 
Measuring a four-by-four square with a rod of length two by this meth-
od would be easy and precise. The rod would fit exactly eight times 
around the perimeter, and the result L(e) would be sixteen. Measuring 
the perimeter of a circle by the same method is more difficult.44 One 
could approximate by moving the straight rod around the edges of the 
circle perpendicular to a line from the center and counting the num-
ber of lengths before returning to where one began. But one would 
really be measuring the perimeter of a polygon in which the circle is 
inscribed, not the perimeter of the circle itself. One could improve the 
measurement by reducing the length of the measuring rod. The small-
er rod would measure out a polygon of more sides, closer in length to 
the circle itself. No matter how small the measuring rod, the approxi-
mation would never be perfect. Nevertheless, as one employed smaller 
and smaller rods, the measurements would converge toward a definite 
figure equal to the diameter of the circle times p.45 
 If that convergence takes place, the figure is “rectifiable.”46 With a 
Koch island, the convergence never happens.47 A smaller measuring 
rod can follow more of the ins and outs at the edge of the figure, but it 
always misses those that are smaller still.48 Each measurement by pro-
gressively smaller measuring rods simply produces a figure (L(e)) 
greater than the last.49 A Koch island, though finite in area, has an infi-
nite perimeter.50 
B. The Mandelbrot Set 
 The fractal most closely associated with Benoit Mandelbrot is the 
eponymous Mandelbrot set.51 The Mandelbrot set lies on a grid of in-
                                                                                                                      
43 Mandelbrot, supra note 8, at 25. 
44 See id. at 27. 
45 See id. (noting that such measurements of the perimeter of a circle would “increase 
but converge rapidly to a limit”). 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 See id. at 26 (explaining how ever more minute measurements are possible). 
49 Mandelbrot, supra note 8, at 26. 
50 See supra notes 40–45 and accompanying text. 
51 See A.K. Dewdney, Computer Recreations: A Computer Microscope Zooms in for a Look at the 
Most Complex Object in Mathematics, Sci. Am., Aug. 1985, at 16, 16 (discussing the Mandel-
brot set). 
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finitesimal points representing complex numbers.52 To generate the 
Mandelbrot set, one subjects an array of numbers represented on that 
grid to an iterative process of calculation and recalculation.53 If the re-
sult does not stray far from where it began, even after a number of it-
erations, the point on the grid representing the starting number is in-
side the Mandelbrot set.54 If the result of the repeated calculation spins 
off to infinity, then the point where one began is outside of the Man-
delbrot set.55 One can “fill in,” on a computer’s display, the points on 
the grid that are within the Mandelbrot set.56 The resulting shape looks 
something like a beetle with a rounded abdomen, a smaller head, and a 
series of protuberances and filigrees around the edges.57 
 One can magnify a section of the edge by subjecting a portion of 
the original array to the same process as before, but on a finer scale— 
the starting points more closely packed and the figures carried to a 
higher number of decimal places.58 The intricate landscape of curls 
and archipelagos generated by “zooming in” on the borders of the 
Mandelbrot set have a strange and alien beauty, and, unlike the Koch 
island, the details are not so regular as to be boring. In fact, any would-
be explorer using widely available software can discover new details in 
the Mandelbrot set.59 Its complexity is inexhaustible. 
C. Fractals Around Us 
 Figures like the Koch island were known long before Mandelbrot, 
but mathematicians dismissed them as monstrosities outside of the nat-
ural order.60 Mandelbrot showed that fractal properties are not freakish 
at all, but quite commonplace in nature.61 For example, Mandelbrot 
argued that the island of Britain exhibits the same difficulties of meas-
                                                                                                                      
52 Id. Complex numbers are composed of two sets of numbers, one real and the other 
“imaginary.” Id. 
53 See id. (describing this iterative process). 
54 Id. at 17. 
55 See id. 
56 See id. at 17–19 (describing how a computer program can map the Mandelbrot set). 
57 See Dewdney, supra note 51, at 17 (providing an example of such a computer gener-
ated image). 
58 See id. at 17–19 (explaining how to create images of specific portions of the Mandel-
brot set). 
59 Mandelbrot Set Generator, Easy Fractal Generator, http://www.easyfractalgenerator 
.com/Mandelbrot-Set-Generator.aspx (last visited Jan. 16, 2012) (offering an on-line ver-
sion of the software). 
60 See Mandelbrot, supra note 8, at 3 (referring to “pathological” figures and a “gal-
lery of monsters”). 
61 Id. at 3–4. 
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urement as a Koch island.62 Although a geographer could follow the 
coastline with a measuring rod, adding up the distances along each bay 
and peninsula, twists and turns smaller than the measuring rod—a 
stone here, a notch there—would have to be glossed over.63 The geog-
rapher could follow smaller details with finer tools, “harnessing a 
mouse, then an ant, and so forth,” to the point of following the con-
tours of each grain of sand on the beach with a microscope.64 But each 
attempt would indicate a longer coastline, and, as with the Koch island, 
the measurements would never converge.65 The length of a coastline, 
Mandelbrot wrote, is “an elusive notion that slips between the fingers of 
one who wants to grasp it.”66 However it is measured, the length of any 
coast is essentially infinite.67 
 Once Mandelbrot popularized the idea of fractals as natural oc-
currences, researchers observed fractal-like structures in a wide array of 
real-world phenomena, from the network of veins on a leaf68 to the 
whorls of gas in interstellar space.69 In the words of John Briggs, whose 
writings celebrate the aesthetic qualities of fractal geometry, “We see 
fractals every day. Trees, mountains, the scattering of autumn leaves in 
the backyard: all these are fractal patterns . . . .”70 The intricacies of 
natural fractals are not truly inexhaustible, like the mathematical ideal, 
but, as Mandelbrot said of natural coastlines, their boundaries can be 
“[so] very large and so ill determined that [they are] best considered 
infinite.”71 Mandelbrot discovered fractal properties even in the fluc-
tuations of the stock market.72 
 Geometric fractals and their natural counterparts are the result of 
iterative processes, repeated and repeated ad infinitum.73 In the natu-
ral context, Briggs refers to fractals as “the tracks and marks left by the 
                                                                                                                      
62 See id. at 36 (“I claim that a Koch curve is a rough but vigorous model of a coast-
line.”). 
63 See id. at 26 (stating that a man “is too big and clumsy” to measure a coastline in in-
crements of less than about fifty centimeters). 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 See Mandelbrot, supra note 8, at 25. 
67 Id. “Hence, if one wishes to compare different coastlines from the viewpoint of their 
‘extent,’ length is an inadequate concept.” Id. 
68 Briggs, supra note 24, at 37. 
69 Id. at 17. 
70 Id. at 22. 
71 Mandelbrot, supra note 8, at 25. 
72 Benoit B. Mandelbrot & Richard L. Hudson, The (Mis)behavior of Markets: 
A Fractal View of Risk, Ruin, and Reward 6 (2004). 
73 See infra notes 74–78 and accompanying text. 
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passage of dynamical activity.”74 In the case of a leaf, the “dynamical 
activity” encompasses the natural processes of growth;75 in the case of a 
coastline, the natural processes of erosion.76 A Koch island is a geomet-
ric construct defined by the method of its creation—a simple step ap-
plied and re-applied to the ever-evolving contour.77 Mandelbrot used 
the term “cascade” to refer to the recursive process that generates a 
fractal.78 
 The cascade may be “ascending,” beginning small and operating at 
ever-larger scales.79 An example would be a process of joining minute 
dust particles into clumps, the clumps into larger clumps, and so on 
until the clumps are nothing less than galaxies.80 A descending cascade 
is one that operates at ever smaller scales, like the mechanism for creat-
ing a Koch island.81 In either case, fractals are closely associated with 
processes or algorithms. The fractal-generating process can even be 
one of elimination.82 One can begin with a line, delete the middle 
third, delete the middle third of the two remaining segments, delete 
the middle third of the remaining four segments, and so on forever.83 
The result is a fractal set of points known as “Cantor dust,” after math-
ematician Georg Cantor.84 
D. The Properties of Fractals 
 Although fractals come in a wide variety of forms (Koch islands, 
natural coastlines, Cantor dust, the Mandelbrot set, and more), they 
share certain characteristics that are important to our discussion. The 
first of these I call “multiplicity.” The processes that create fractals sub-
ject their objects to geometric progressions of added complexity. After 
the first step, the figure that will evolve into a Koch island has three 
points; at the Star of David stage, six points; at the next stage, eighteen 
                                                                                                                      
74 Briggs, supra note 24, at 22. 
75 Id. at 22. 
76 Id. 
77 See Mandelbrot, supra note 8, at 42–43 (supplying two methods for constructing a 
Koch island). 
78 See id. at 34 (describing the process of creating ever smaller details as a “cascade”). 
79 See id. at 93 (describing an “ascending cascade” as the accretion of small particles in-
to a larger whole). 
80 Id. 
81 See id. at 43, 93 (describing a Koch island as a descending cascade in which the space 
surrounding the figure is divided into smaller and smaller pieces). 
82 Briggs, supra note 24, at 67. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
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points; then fifty-four points, etc.85 The process that leads to Cantor 
dust begins with one line segment; then it is two line segments; then 
four, eight, sixteen, thirty-two, and so forth.86 With true fractals, this 
progression leads on to infinity.87 Natural fractal analogs, like the veins 
in a leaf, do not proceed to infinity, but, like the length of an actual 
coastline, after a point the multiplication may be treated as essentially 
limitless.88 Briggs reproduces a verse of Jonathan Swift offering a whim-
sical take on nature’s fractal scaling: “So, Nat’ralists observe, a Flea / 
Hath smaller Fleas that on him pray, / And these have smaller yet to 
bite’m, / And so proceed, ad infinitum.”89 Even if the progression of 
smaller fleas does not proceed ad infinitum, it would not take many 
generations before the numbers swelled to epic proportions. 
 A second, and related, fractal property I call “latency.” A fractal is 
always, in a sense, a work in progress. The details of a Koch island 
emerge as one follows the steps of its construction. Because there are 
an infinite number of steps, a completed Koch island is something one 
can imagine but never produce. Perhaps the Mandelbrot set can be 
defined in advance by its mathematical properties,90 but as far as hu-
man knowledge of its contents is concerned, that too is a matter of an 
ongoing process. The shapes that lie on the fringes of the Mandelbrot 
set will always include levels of detail as yet unobserved. The same is 
true of natural fractals of sufficient depth. If one could imagine freez-
ing, for a moment, every process—from tectonic drift to Brownian mo-
tion—that alters the shores of Britain, perhaps the coastline would have 
a definite shape. But mapping that shape in all of its minute contours 
would be a process always shy of completion. 
 A third property of fractals is “self-similarity.”91 Self-similarity 
means that similar patterns appear at any scale.92 Briggs illustrates self-
similarity with a series of four photographs of a vine-covered wall, each 
                                                                                                                      
85 See Mandelbrot, supra note 8, at 42–43 (illustrating Koch islands at these stages). 
86 See Briggs, supra note 24, at 67 (illustrating the stages of this process). 
87 See id. at 66–67 (indicating that the processes used to create Cantor dust and Koch 
islands are repeated “indefinitely”). 
88 See Mandelbrot, supra note 8, at 26 (suggesting that even with ever smaller measur-
ing tools, the contours of the coastline are always more minute, and the length increases 
without limit). 
89 Jonathan Swift, On Poetry: A Rhapsody, in Briggs, supra note 24, at 41. 
90 Certain properties of the Mandelbrot set have been mathematically proven, like the 
connection, if only by a narrow filament, of each portion of the set to the rest. See Dewd-
ney, supra note 51, at 20 (referring to the theorem of Adrian Douady). 
91 See Mandelbrot, supra note 8, at 34 (describing “self-similarity” as “when each piece 
of a shape is geometrically similar to the whole”). 
92 See id. 
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magnifying a portion of the photograph that precedes it.93 The photo-
graphs are not identical, yet they each exhibit a similar landscape of 
branching and interwoven tendrils.94 The coastline of Britain is self-
similar at a broad range of scales, so that one could not tell, by observ-
ing an outline, whether one was looking at the contours of many miles 
of coastline or only a few.95 Geometric fractals have the same property 
of scale-independence.96 Magnify a portion of a Koch island as much as 
you like, and you will always see the same pattern of triangles-upon-
triangles that you saw before.97 The Mandelbrot set is not as regular as 
that; the patterns one finds by magnifying portions of the Mandelbrot 
set are unpredictable.98 Those patterns, however, are always broadly 
similar.99 One of the intriguing properties of the Mandelbrot set is the 
reappearance at vast magnifications of beetle-like figures that closely 
resemble the Mandelbrot set as a whole—universes within universes.100 
E. Law as a Fractal 
 At least in the literature of patent law, the fractal properties of in-
vention are seldom discussed. That does not mean that fractals are un-
known in legal scholarship.101 In fact, law itself has been proposed as a 
fractal object.102 As we will see, the reasons for treating invention as a 
fractal object are much the same. 
 Professors advise law students facing their first round of fact-
pattern-based exams to treat the issues presented as a tree of many 
branches. A successful analysis follows each branch to its conclusion, 
then backs up to follow, in the same fashion, alternative branches 
formed when a predicate question cannot be answered with certainty. 
In this respect at least, exams mirror reality. Legal analysis is a journey 
                                                                                                                      
93 See Briggs, supra note 24, at 22–23 (providing and explaining a series of photo-
graphs of vines). 
94 See id. 
95 David G. Post & Michael B. Eisen, How Long Is the Coastline of the Law? Thoughts on the 
Fractal Nature of Legal Systems, 29 J. Legal Stud. 545, 551–52 (2000). 
96 Id. at 551. 
97 See Briggs, supra note 24, at 66 (illustrating Koch islands). 
98 See Dewdney, supra note 51, at 16, 19–20 (noting that, as one looks closely at por-
tions of the Mandelbrot set, one sees shapes similar to the whole set, but not exactly the 
same). 
99 See id. 
100 See id. 
101 See Post & Eisen, supra note 95, at 546 (proposing that legal arguments and case ci-
tations exhibit a fractal structure). 
102 See id. 
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through a branching set of inquiries.103 Although illustrations could be 
found in virtually any area of law,104 copyright law serves as well as 
any.105 
 The most basic question in a copyright suit is, who wins?106 If plain-
tiff wins, the court proceeds to the available remedies for infringement; 
if defendant wins, the court dismisses the case. Plaintiff wins only if the 
court decides in its favor, at every turn, through a complicated series of 
inquiries.107 Does the court have jurisdiction to decide the case?108 If 
so, does plaintiff own the copyright to the work in question?109 If so, is 
the copyright valid?110 If so, does defendant infringe?111 Some of these 
questions lead to further, subsidiary questions.112 With respect to valid-
ity, the court must inquire whether plaintiff’s work is a work of author-
ship,113 whether it is original,114 and whether it is “fixed in a tangible 
medium of expression.”115 On the infringement branch, the court must 
find proof of actionable copying.116 One option is direct proof—a wit-
                                                                                                                      
103 See J.M. Balkin, The Crystalline Structure of Legal Thought, 39 Rutgers L. Rev. 1, 4–13 
(1986) [hereinafter Balkin, Crystalline Structure] (explaining how legal doctrines arose 
through a dialectic process of a series of dichotomous choices over time). Jack Balkin may 
have been the first to treat this branching structure as a fractal. He first referred to the 
“crystalline structure” of legal argument. See id. at 2–3. He determined later that “fractal 
structure” would have been a better term. J.M. Balkin, The Promise of Legal Semiotics, 69 Tex. 
L. Rev. 1831, 1836 (1991). The same theme has been explored more recently by David 
Post and Michael Eisen. See Post & Eisen, supra note 95, at 546. They observe that “legal 
arguments have a kind of fractal structure—recursively generated and possessed of a 
branching, self-similar, tree-like structure at all levels of the argumentation hierarchy.” Id. 
104 Balkin, Crystalline Structure, supra note 103, at 4–13. 
105 See Post & Eisen, supra note 95, at 554–55. 
106 See id. at 554 (noting that the central question in such a lawsuit is whether the de-
fendant is liable to the plaintiff). 
107 See id. at 554–55 (describing the branching set of inquiries). 
108 Id. at 555. 
109 See id. at 554–55. 
110 See id. 
111 Post & Eisen, supra note 95, at 554–55. 
112 See id. 
113 Id. at 555; see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in 
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . .”); Feist 
Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991) (stating that copyrightable 
works must “owe their origin to an act of authorship”). 
114 See Post & Eisen, supra note 95, at 555; see also Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (“To qualify for 
copyright protection, a work must be original to the author.”). 
115 See Post & Eisen, supra note 95, at 555; see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (requiring fixation 
in a tangible medium for copyright protection to attach); Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int’l, 
Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 873–74 (3d Cir. 1982) (discussing the fixation requirement). 
116 See Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1169 (7th Cir. 1997) (“The 
Copyright Act forbids only copying; if independent creation results in an identical work, 
the creator of that work is still free to sell it.”). 
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ness to the act. Without direct proof, plaintiff may establish copying 
through a combination of access to the copyrighted work plus “substan-
tial similarity.”117 Determining whether the works are similar enough to 
be “substantially similar” requires “yet another two-part analysis.”118 
First the court considers whether the works include extrinsically similar 
expression, applying objective criteria.119 If so, they must also be intrin-
sically similar, meaning that they present the same “total concept and 
feel” from the perspective of the intended audience.120 In order to 
identify the intended audience, the court must determine if the work is 
meant for average adults, connoisseurs, or five-year-old children.121 
 Although the order of inquiry may differ—a court may jump 
straight to the issue of substantial similarity if the works are nothing 
alike—the structure itself is intrinsic to the law of copyright.122 Systems 
of law are organized into tree-like structures of question upon question, 
not unlike the promontory upon promontory that distinguishes a Koch 
island.123 The branching here is a matter of categorization rather than 
geometry; the tree occupies a taxonometric space, rather than a physi-
cal space. And the branching does not go on forever, as it would with a 
true fractal; if it did, no court could ever reach a decision.124 But the 
fractal metaphor is a useful one, as it is when discussing natural phe-
nomena with similar properties. 
 The fractal nature of legal inquiry creates multiplicity. Copyright 
cases can be resolved in many different ways, depending on where the 
court’s journey through the doctrinal anfractuosities comes to rest.125 
Law also has the property of latency. Courts are ever in the process of 
elaborating upon the complex tangle of legal issues, driven in part by 
                                                                                                                      
117 See Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens, Inc., 241 F.3d 350, 353–54 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating that 
such indirect evidence is sufficient when direct evidence of copying is unavailable). 
118 Lyons P’ship v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 801 (4th Cir. 2001). 
119 See Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356–57 (9th Cir. 1990) (describing the ex-
trinsic test and its objective criteria). The analysis may differ in other circuits. See, e.g., Ly-
ons, 243 F.3d at 801 (describing an extrinsic test for substantially similar “ideas”). 
120 Lyons, 243 F.3d at 801; see also Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1360 (describing the use of the “to-
tal concept and feel” standard). 
121 See Lyons, 243 F.3d at 802. 
122 See Post & Eisen, supra note 95, at 554–55 (noting that this inquiry can branch up-
wards through higher levels of abstraction and, depending on what the defendant con-
tests, the court may not need to explore all of these branches). 
123 See id. at 550, 553 (comparing legal argumentation to a branching tree and a Koch 
island). 
124 See id. at 559 (“Each decided case represents a single instantiation of this process 
that has come to rest at some point, each opinion a single tree in the forest of judicial 
opinions.”). 
125 See id. at 554–55 (explaining the fractal structure of a copyright dispute). 
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new fact situations that had not presented themselves before.126 Finally, 
legal inquiry is, in some respects, self-similar. Legal argument has “no 
‘natural’ scale”: “We can always zoom in on any argumentative point, 
looking at it as the root of a deeply branching structure, or zoom out 
and look at it as a small part of a larger recursively branching struc-
ture.”127 The branching process can only “in theory” continue for-
ever.128 It may not be true that we can “always” lose ourselves in the doc-
trinal thicket to the point that fundamental questions cannot be 
distinguished from minute refinements.129 However, the branching ex-
ists at many levels and the way that the branching occurs seems indis-
tinguishable. If one diagrammed, without labels, how one, multi-part 
legal inquiry leads to another, one could not tell whether a portion of 
that diagram represented a high-level or low-level analysis. 
 The idea that law is a fractal is important when we turn to techno-
logical rather than legal inquiries. The reason is that the fractal proper-
ties of law derive from the hierarchical, ever-branching nature of legal 
analysis; a general question leads to subsidiary questions, and so on 
through many levels. If the same is true of technological advancement, 
then invention, like law, has fractal characteristics. 
II. The Fractal Properties of Invention 
 Invention is, in general, an effort to discover new technological 
solutions to the needs of mankind.130 As observed by Henry Petroski, 
an engineer and historian who has studied the origins of technological 
artifacts as familiar as pencils and toothpicks,131 “Unlike problems in 
                                                                                                                      
126 See, e.g., Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 
1157, 1164–65 (9th Cir. 1977) (engaging for the first time in the intrinsic/ extrinsic analy-
sis of “substantial similarity”), superseded on other grounds by statute, Copyright Act of 1976, 
Pub. L. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976). In 1990, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit revised and embellished the analysis further. See Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1356–57 (explaining 
how cases since Krofft have further developed the standard and characterizing the analysis 
as objective/subjective, instead of extrinsic/intrinsic). Future cases will no doubt continue 
the work. 
127 Post & Eisen, supra note 95, at 558. 
128 See id. at 558 & n.25 (explaining that it may always be possible to continue to subdi-
vide legal issues into new branches). 
129 See id. at 558 (suggesting that, as one zooms in and out through legal argumenta-
tion, all portions have a similar branching structure). 
130 Steven J. Paley, The Art of Invention: The Creative Process of Discovery 
and Design 23 (2010) (explaining that most inventions were developed to solve a preex-
isting problem). 
131 See generally Henry Petroski, The Pencil: A History of Design and Circum-
stance (paperback ed. 1992) (discussing the origins of the pencil); Henry Petroski, The 
Toothpick: Technology and Culture (2007) (describing the history of the toothpick). 
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mathematics, which practically always have a unique answer, a single 
problem in engineering and technology can have many different solu-
tions.”132 Those solutions are not isolated; they are, instead, connected 
through a network of questions and answers—a network limited only by 
the imagination of inventors and the laws of natural science. Invention 
is a journey through diverging paths that lead in many directions; each 
destination, in turn, suggests new paths to follow. Like legal analysis, 
invention can be compared to the continuous branching of the Koch 
island. 
 Section II.A describes inventions that are created by individuals,133 
whereas Section II.B describes inventions that are the products of col-
laborative processes, such as expanding and improving prior inven-
tions.134 Section II.C examines the fractal properties of multiplicity, la-
tency, and self-similarity in those processes of invention.135 Section II.D 
discusses the difficulties associated with modeling these processes of 
invention as geometric fractals.136 
A. Invention by Individuals 
 Much of what we know about invention is anecdotal. In the popu-
lar imagination, the “flash of genius,” in which the inventor/hero, in a 
burst of inspiration, beholds the invention entire in his imagination, 
still plays a prominent role.137 But even when such sudden insights can 
be documented, they are likely accompanied by a step-by-step process 
of implementation and improvement. The invention of hook-and-loop 
fasteners (generally known as Velcro) supplies a good example.138 In 
1848, when Swiss inventor George de Mestral returned from an amble 
in the woods with his dog, he discovered cockleburs stuck to his cloth-
ing.139 His “flash of genius” was to imagine a clothing fastener based on 
                                                                                                                      
132 Henry Petroski, Invention by Design: How Engineers Get from Thought to 
Thing 112 (1996). 
133 See infra notes 137–155 and accompanying text. 
134 See infra notes 156–191 and accompanying text. 
135 See infra notes 192–209 and accompanying text. 
136 See infra notes 210–212 and accompanying text. 
137 A recent motion picture about an inventor and his struggles used “Flash of Genius” 
as its title. Flash of Genius (Universal Pictures 2008). The term dates back to the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 
(1941). By adopting the nonobviousness standard in the 1952 Patent Act, Congress dis-
avowed the notion that patentability must reflect “genius.” Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 
U.S. 1, 15 (1966). 
138 See Petroski, supra note 132, at 78–80 (recounting the story of the invention of 
Velcro). 
139 Id. at 78. 
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the same physical mechanism, shown by microscopic examination to be 
tiny hooks in the cockleburs entangled in the threads of his clothing.140 
“Almost immediately,” de Mestral envisioned complementary pieces of 
fabric, one lined with hooks and the other with loops, that could be 
combined as a “soft but tenacious fastener” for clothing.141 
 This immediate insight did not produce a viable product until six 
years later.142 In spite of the soundness of the general idea, “many ques-
tions . . . had to be faced,” such as “how many hooks [the fastener] 
should have, of what material they should be made, how they should be 
formed, and so forth.”143 Answering these questions required exploring 
a number of alternatives.144 The optimal number of loops proved to be 
300 per square inch, and nylon was identified as a superior material to 
the cotton used in the prototype.145 Further discoveries emerged in the 
development process, including the use of infrared light to toughen 
the nylon.146 
 Even this simple story of invention exhibits fractal characteristics. 
Of all the ways one might fasten clothing, de Mestral pursued the path 
of miniature hooks and loops. From that beginning stemmed alterna-
tive paths of cotton and nylon, and from the choice of nylon alternative 
paths of treated or untreated material. The well-known story of Edi-
son’s search for a practical light bulb filament suggests similar branch-
ing.147 Edison’s team tested both metals, like platinum, and carbonized 
natural fibers, like slivers of wood.148 Among the varieties of wood test-
ed were hickory, rosewood, and spruce.149 The experimenters tried the 
same materials in a variety of shapes: “boxes, spirals, circles, horseshoes, 
and fanciful sprouts and curlicues.”150 The first success came with a 
horseshoe-shaped carbonized cotton thread.151 
                                                                                                                      
140 See id. at 79 (stating that de Mestral devised his invention upon observing cockle-
burs under a microscope). 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 80. 
143 Id. at 79–80. 




147 See Jane Brox, Brilliant: The Evolution of Artificial Light 115–16 (2010) 
(describing the process of trial-and-error by which Edison discovered the best filament). 
148 Id. at 115. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 116. 
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 The thought process of the inventor may or may not follow an or-
derly path. Some inventors adopt a “systems approach” or “‘top-down’ 
method of problem solving that looks at the major systems or func-
tional elements of the invention before focusing on the smaller de-
tails.”152 Software engineering typically proceeds in this way.153 The de-
signer “charts out the major functional areas in very general terms and 
then logically connects them—all before writing a single line of pro-
gramming code.”154 In contrast, the inventor of the implantable pace-
maker preferred a “big jump” to prove the value of a concept, followed 
by backtracking to “fill in the gaps.”155 Regardless of which procedure 
an inventor chooses, the underlying structure is the same. An inventor 
begins with a problem to be solved and a number of paths to pursue. 
From each of those paths branch further paths, in an ever-expanding 
network of possibilities. For each question in the form, “How can that 
be done?,” there is more than one answer. And, for each answer an-
other question: “How, in turn, can that be done?” 
B. Invention as a Collective Endeavor 
 The fractal nature of invention is more apparent if one looks at 
invention as a collective enterprise. George Basalla regards technologi-
cal development, as a whole, as a grand evolutionary process.156 
“[O]nce we actively search for continuity,” he writes, “it becomes ap-
parent that every novel artifact has an antecedent. . . . Whenever we 
encounter an artifact, no matter what its age or provenance, we can be 
certain that it was modeled on one or more preexisting artifacts.”157 
Even breakthrough inventions like Eli Whitney’s cotton gin were modi-
                                                                                                                      
152 Paley, supra note 130, at 158. 
153 Id. 
154 Id.; see also Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 697–98 (2d Cir. 
1992) (describing the top-down process of computer program design, beginning with the 
identification of the program’s “ultimate function or purpose,” and ending with the pro-
gram code). 
155 See Kenneth A. Brown, Inventors at Work: Interviews with 16 Notable 
American Inventors 29 (1988). 
In the pacemaker, for example, throwing a bunch of parts together and touch-
ing the wires to a dog’s heart to make it beat—that was a big jump. After that 
jump, I could go back and fill in different details: What kind of materials can be 
used in the body? What kind of circuitry can be used? 
Id. 
156 See Basalla, supra note 6, at 208–09 (explaining the diversity of human artifacts 
through a theory of continuous technological evolution). 
157 Id. 
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fications of existing technology.158 In Basalla’s view, everything con-
nects.159 An “omniscient intelligence . . . capable of knowing the ante-
cedents of all existing and vanished artifacts” would have the ability to 
“reconstruct the grand and vast network of linked artifacts that consti-
tute the history of material culture.”160 This network would converge 
and all streams unite at “that remote point in time when the first object 
was shaped by protohuman hands.”161 
 One need not be omniscient to observe the connectedness of in-
ventive ideas. As Petroski has shown, even as humble an artifact as the 
paper clip is the product of a complex web of technological develop-
ment.162 Paper clips rely on the natural properties of elasticity discov-
ered by physicist Robert Hooke.163 Since the development of steel wire 
in the latter part of the nineteenth century, paper clips have been de-
vised in a staggering variety of shapes.164 They come in the form of rec-
tangles, triangles, circles, ovals, and tortuous figures that have no 
name.165 Each variation “evolved in response to the failure of existing 
forms to reach perfection.”166 And each clip became, in turn, “an ob-
ject of criticism” —an inspiration for inventors who, “perhaps just by 
giving this or that leg of a paper clip a slightly different bend, turn, or 
twist,” thought to eliminate the shortcomings of the existing design.167 
 The paper clip we commonly see today is known as the Gem 
clip.168 Its elongated, round-ended, loop-within-a-loop shape is so famil-
                                                                                                                      
158 Id. at 33–34. 
159 See id. at 209 (stating that every artifact from every age was modeled on something 
that came before). 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 See Petroski, supra note 132, at 10–27 (describing the evolution of the paper clip). 
163 See id. at 11 (describing how the principle of elasticity has contributed to the art of 
paper fastening). “What Hooke discovered was that, up to a limit, each object stretches in 
proportion to the force applied to it. Conversely, the more we stretch something elastic, 
the more resistance it offers to being further stretched.” Id. 
164 See Henry Petroski, The Evolution of Useful Things 59, 62 (1992). 
165 See id. at 60–77 (illustrating several paper clip designs). 
When all is said and done, any attempt to sort out the origins and the patent 
history of the paper clip may be an exercise in futility. For there appear to 
have been countless variations on the device, a great multiplicity of forms, 
and some of the earliest and most interesting versions seem not to have been 
patented at all . . . . 
Id. at 62. 
166 Id. 
167 Petroski, supra note 132, at 16. 
168 Id. 
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iar that, for many of us, the Gem is what we mean by “paper clip.”169 
The ubiquity of the Gem clip attests to the strengths of its design. Gem 
clips are inexpensive, simple, intuitive, and effective.170 But they are not 
perfect. Their grip can be tenuous, particularly if metal fatigue sets 
in.171 Their exposed wire ends can snag pages.172 And they frequently 
become entangled in the box, or when sets of clipped pages are kept 
together.173 The Gem clip has long been the starting point for im-
proved designs meant to address these shortcomings.174 The chief rival 
of the Gem clip is the Gothic clip, so named because its pointed ends 
resemble Gothic arches, in contrast to the Romanesque contours of the 
Gem.175 The Gothic clip, patented by Henry Lankenau in 1934, has 
longer “legs” than a Gem clip.176 This reduces the snagging potential 
and, because it is less likely to damage the paper, the Gothic clip can be 
made of heavier wire for a stronger grip.177 These advantages have 
made the Gothic clip a favorite among librarians.178 Yet even the Gothic 
clip is not, necessarily, the apotheosis of the paper clip. The first page 
of Lankenau’s patent shows not one clip design but several.179 Some 
have points on the inner and outer loops, some have squared ends on 
the outer loop, some have indentations (curved or pointed) on either 
loop, and some feature rakish angles that are difficult to describe.180 
 If one were to diagram the full spectrum of paper clip designs, all 
relying on steel wire and the fundamental properties of elasticity, the 
elongated double-loop racetrack configuration—exemplified by the 
Gem clip—would occupy only a small corner of the diagram. A small 
corner of that corner might be devoted to the long-legged Gothic de-
signs, with further subdivisions devoted to each of Lankenau’s alterna-
tives. Each variation is the starting point for further variations—a pro-
                                                                                                                      
169 See Petroski, supra note 164, at 68 (“Indeed, to the vast majority of people today it 
is virtually synonymous with paper clip.”). 
170 See id. at 70 (“The common paper clip is light, inexpensive, strong, easy to use, and 
quite good-looking.” (quoting Paul Goldberger, On the Rise: Architecture and De-
sign in a Postmodern Age 288 (1985))). 
171 See id. at 73 (discussing improvements on the Gem clip to give it more gripping 
power). 
172 See id. at 71–72 (discussing improvements to the Gem clip to prevent snagging). 
173 See Petroski, supra note 132, at 25–26 (discussing this disadvantage of the Gem de-
sign). 





179 U.S. Patent No. 1,985,866 figs.1–9 (filed Nov. 23, 1933) [hereinafter ’866 Patent]. 
180 Id. 
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gression suggesting a fractal network. Of course, not every path leads to 
a successful product. Most paper clip variations are known only to those 
who have studied their development as a matter of historical interest. 
So far, most of the branches in the paper clip family tree lead to dead 
ends.181 As George Basalla, who finds continuity in all technological 
development, writes: 
[A]ll variants of an artifact are not of equal importance. Some 
are simply inoperable; some are ineffective; and some are ef-
fective but have little technological and social influence. Only 
a few variants have the potential to start a new branching se-
ries that will greatly enrich the stream of made things, have an 
impact on human life, and become known as “great inven-
tions” or “turning points in the history of technology.”182 
Although many developments lead nowhere, Basalla’s reference to “a 
new branching series” is a telling one. 
 Basalla contends that the basic continuity of technological devel-
opment has been “obscured by the myth of the heroic inventor genius, 
by nationalistic pride, by the patent system, and by the tendency to 
equate technological change with social, scientific, and economic revo-
lutions.”183 As far as the patent system is concerned, his observation 
must be qualified. By singling out certain technological advancements 
as patentable inventions, and by excluding achievements within the 
reach of the “person of ordinary skill in the art,” the patent system em-
phasizes discontinuity.184 Nevertheless, artifacts of the connectedness of 
invention appear everywhere in patent law. 
 Section 101 of the Patent Act promises exclusive rights to the dis-
coverer of a “process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, 
or any new and useful improvement thereof.”185 One who discovers a non-
obvious species of a patented genus can obtain a patent on the species, 
leading to “blocking patents” that prevent either party from exploiting 
                                                                                                                      
181 See Petroski, supra note 132, at 16 (noting that few of the early designs for paper 
clips have survived the test of time). 
182 Basalla, supra note 6, at 34. 
183 Id. at 208. 
184 See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 
No. 112-29, § 3(c), (n), 125 Stat. 284, 287, 293 (2011) (effective Mar. 16, 2013) (stating 
that an invention may not be patented if “the subject matter as a whole would have been 
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art”). 
185 35 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). 
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the narrower invention.186 Most patents feature dependent claims, cov-
ering more specific variants of the invention than those encompassed by 
the independent claims.187 And whether the alternative embodiments 
are separately claimed or not, many patents, like Lankenau’s Gothic clip 
patent, disclose different ways in which the invention may be prac-
ticed.188 All of these things indicate a succession of variations within var-
iations, a theme echoed in the thematic classes and subclasses used by 
the Patent and Trademark Office to categorize inventions as potential 
prior art.189 In the field of mousetraps, for example, class 43 covers Fish-
ing, Trapping, and Vermin Destroying. Traps begin with subclass 58, and 
include categories for traps that imprison, electrocute, choke, squeeze, 
smite, impale, and blow up their victims.190 Some of these are broken 
down further. Subclass 94, for example, covers the “wedge or toggle” 
option for the subclass 93 “direct engagement” version of the subclass 
92 “modified trigger mechanism” variant of the basic subclass 88 “jaw” 
trap.191 
 In spite of the mythic attraction of the “heroic inventor genius,” it 
should be an uncontroversial proposition that technological progress 
is, in general, a process of evolution, variation, and improvement. Most 
inventions, at least, are a part of a larger network of inventions. If that 
network is a fractal network in which one advancement leads to an-
other and another, one would expect to find, in the realm of invention, 
the fractal properties of multiplicity, latency, and self-similarity. 
                                                                                                                      
186 See Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. A-Roo Co., 222 F.3d 1372, 1379 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“A 
‘blocking patent’ is an earlier patent that must be licensed in order to practice a later pat-
ent. This often occurs, for instance, between a pioneer patent and an improvement pat-
ent.”); Utter v. Hiraga, 845 F.2d 993, 998 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“There is no inconsistency in 
awarding a generic count to one inventor, while awarding a patentably distinct species 
count to another . . . .”); Kevin Emerson Collins, The Reach of Literal Claim Scope into After-
Arising Technology: On Thing Construction and the Meaning of Meaning, 41 Conn. L. Rev. 493, 
510–12 (2008) (describing features of blocking patents through examples). 
187 See Monsanto Co. v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 503 F.3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
188 See, e.g., ’866 Patent, supra note 179, figs.1–9 (showing several ways to make the 
Gothic clip). 
189 See US Classes by Number Menu, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Aug. 11, 2011, 
5:43 PM), http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/selectbynum.htm (providing 
links to all such classes by their index numbers). 
190 Class 43, Fishing, Trapping, and Vermin-Destroying, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Aug. 
11, 2011, 5:43 PM), http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc043/sched043.htm. 
191 Id. 
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C. Multiplicity, Latency, and Self-Similarity 
 As the paper clip example suggests, technological artifacts come in 
an astonishing variety of forms.192 An illustration reproduced by Basalla 
depicts fifty-seven designs for smokestack spark arrestors—a sampling 
of the more than one thousand such designs patented in the nine-
teenth century, when embers from wood-burning locomotives were a 
frequent source of brushfires.193 Petroski reviews the enormous diver-
sity to be found in the design of hammers and nails,194 and he reports 
that nineteenth century foresters could choose from an impressive ar-
ray of axe designs—including Georgia, Jersey, Kentucky, North Caro-
lina, Maine, or Michigan axes—depending on their needs and geo-
graphic loyalties.195 Of all the varieties of technology devised by 
humanity, only a very small fraction is likely to be patented.196 Yet if one 
counts as separate “species” just the inventions patented in the United 
States (a figure above eight million,197 not counting the variations that 
might be separately claimed in a single patent), the level of diversity in 
the technological realm begins to rival that of biological diversity.198 
 Technology evolves in such a variety of forms because of the many 
choices facing the inventor. One fork in the road leads to the next. 
Even if each branching represents only two, or three, or a dozen alter-
natives, the geometric progression soon multiplies the possibilities 
enormously, just as the intricacies of a Koch island exceed the resolving 
powers of the human eye after only a few generations. The choices pur-
sued depend on the imagination of the inventor and the tradeoffs that 
the inventor is willing to accept—perhaps for the sake of serving a spe-
cialized set of needs. Hence, the world has seen hammers, axes, and 
spark arrestors designed in countless forms. And there is no sign of 
slowing down. In 2010, the Patent Office issued more than 219,000 pa-
                                                                                                                      
192 See Basalla, supra note 6, at 1 (referring to the easily overlooked “diversity of 
things made by human hands”). 
193 Id. at 136. 
194 Petroski, supra note 164, at 128–29. 
195 Id. at 126. 
196 See id. at 62 (noting that many early forms of the paper clip were never patented). 
197 See Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office Issues Patent Number 8,000,000 (Aug. 16, 2011), available at http://www.uspto. 
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patents and patent applications since 1790). 
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tents—a new record.199 Like the twists and turns of the coast of Britain, 
the shores of invention appear to be, for practical purposes, limitless. 
 Invention also exhibits the property of latency. Like the endlessly 
multiplied details of a fractal curve, invention is always a work in pro-
gress. The “cascade” that extends the borders of invention is the proc-
ess of inquiry and the pursuit of new alternatives. Invention is an “itera-
tive process,” wherein “[w]e take a step, look around, assess, and then go 
on to the next step.”200 The tensions between plan and implementation 
compel changes in both, at first “large and sweeping,” but after “succes-
sive iterations” increasingly “smaller and more refined.”201 The process 
is “asymptotic,” meaning that the adjustments become smaller as they 
produce diminishing returns, but it is never complete.202 
 The most debatable point is whether the continuous branchings of 
invention exhibit self-similarity; in other words, whether the pattern is 
basically the same when we are dealing with the kind of breakthroughs 
that, in Basalla’s words, “will greatly enrich the stream of made things, 
have an impact on human life, and become known as ‘great inven-
tions,’”203 or only the more mundane refinements that go on every day. 
No one would deny that some inventions are more fundamental than 
others. The Wright brothers’ patent on the flying machine is nearer the 
trunk of the tree than the latest refinement in airfoil design. But self-
similarity does not require that all inventions be the same, any more 
than it requires that each triangle added to the Koch island be of the 
same size, or that the patterns of the Mandelbrot set repeat themselves 
exactly. The issue is whether the branching that occurs at one level is 
different in some respect than the branching that occurs at another. 
Are there, for example, fewer choices as one goes on? Does the geo-
metric progression expand at the same rate always, or does it begin to 
contract? 
 The remark that invention is “asymptotic” might suggest contrac-
tion.204 If there were perfect technological solutions to human prob-
lems, then one would expect the process of design to hone in on those 
few by ever finer measures, just as one comes closer and closer to the 
true diameter of a circle by employing ever smaller measuring rods. 
                                                                                                                      
199 See Patent Activity, supra note 197 (listing the numbers of patents granted each year). 
200 Paley, supra note 130, at 171. 
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202 Id. at 167. 
203 Basalla, supra note 6, at 34. 
204 See Paley, supra note 130, at 167 (stating that, at a certain point, further changes 
will result in “diminishing returns”). 
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Technological solutions would be, in the language of fractal geometry, 
“rectifiable.”205 Some classic designs, like the Gem paper clip, seem to 
occupy regions of stability. The Gem performs its function so well that 
attempts to introduce improvements may have encountered diminish-
ing returns. On the other hand, Petroski insists that “[s]ince nothing is 
perfect, and, indeed, even our ideas of perfection are not static, every-
thing is subject to change over time. There can be no such thing as a 
‘perfected’ artifact; the future perfect can only be a tense, not a 
thing.”206 Perhaps some new critic of the Gem design will discover the 
alternative that launches a paper-fastening revolution.207 
 No one can say for certain whether technological development will 
always go on as it has, nor does it matter for our purposes. As the vol-
ume of activity at the Patent Office suggests, the pace of innovation has 
not slowed,208 and today’s inventions seem as likely as those of the past 
to supply the basis for further improvements, or, in Basalla’s words, 
“new branching series.”209 
D. The Shape of Invention 
 Although the ever-multiplying promontories of the Koch island 
are a convenient metaphor for the ever-expanding frontiers of inven-
tion, in some respects, that simplest of fractals is too simple to capture 
the complexities of technological advancement. For one thing, it does 
not account for the finished designs that are put to use. In theory, one 
might explore the possibilities of hook-and-loop fasteners forever; in 
practice, firms that produce Velcro answer, at least provisionally, every 
question that might be asked about how the product should be made. 
The “coastline” of Velcro, like the perimeter of a Koch island, may be 
infinite. In other words, one may never exhaust all of the possibilities 
for how hook-and-loop fasteners could be devised. Nevertheless, there 
are established points on that coastline representing completed designs. 
Or, to change analogies, there are fruits hanging from the boughs of 
                                                                                                                      
205 See Mandelbrot, supra note 8, at 27 (describing a curve as “rectifiable” when ap-
proximate measurements of its length converge rapidly to a limit, as measurements of a 
circle’s circumference converge to p times the diameter of the circle). 
206 Petroski, supra note 164, at 22. 
207 See Petroski, supra note 132, at 42 (“It is unlikely that there will be an end to new 
ideas for paper clips any time soon . . . .”). 
208 See Patent Activity, supra note 197 (listing the numbers of patents granted each year). 
209 See Basalla, supra note 6, at 34 (explaining that, although some innovations lead to 
dead ends, others will give rise to a “new branching series”). 
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invention, and they are not forever out of reach due to the endless 
branching of the tree. The fruits can be, and some have been, picked. 
 The Koch island is also too orderly a fractal to embody the genu-
ine messiness of technological advancement. Basalla provides an illus-
tration contrasting the tree of organic life to the tree of technological 
artifacts.210 The former looks like a conventional tree, with branches 
dividing and dividing again, until the limbs are reduced to a multitude 
of twigs.211 The tree of artifacts, on the other hand, is a tangle of inter-
connections, reflecting the potential of one avenue of technological 
development to contribute to another.212 Advances in metallurgy, for 
example, might connect with advances in airfoils, mousetraps, and pa-
per clips. 
 Furthermore, any attempt to diagram the island of technology 
would have an arbitrary character in comparison to the inevitable 
growth of a Koch island. If we return to the simple example of Velcro, 
one’s diagram might feature hook-and-loop fasteners as the “main 
branch,” followed by subbranches for the alternatives of cotton and ny-
lon, with nylon further subdivided into infrared-treated and untreated 
fabric. On the other hand, one could just as easily begin with nylon fas-
teners as the “main branch,” followed by subbranches for nylon zippers 
and nylon hook-and-loop fasteners. The actual paths of technological 
development are matters of historical accident. If one could diagram 
technological relationships in a more abstract, timeless fashion, some-
thing more complicated than a Koch island would be required. 
 In spite of these complexities, the basic point remains—technologi-
cal progress is an ongoing, interconnected, continuously branching en-
deavor that exhibits some of the characteristics of a fractal. The prob-
lems this creates for a legal system devoted to assigning individuals 
exclusive rights to inventions are discussed in the Part III. 
III. Fractals and the Patent System 
 The primary justification for awarding patents in the United States 
is set forth in Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution.213 Patents 
“promote the Progress of the useful Arts,” by allowing inventors, for a 
                                                                                                                      
210 Id. at 138. 
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213 U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power “To promote the Progress 
of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
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limited time, exclusive rights to income made from their inventions.214 
During the term of the patent, the owner has the exclusive right to 
make, use, sell, offer to sell, or import into the United States the inven-
tion set forth in the claims.215 
 Originally, the patent system relied on “central claiming” to iden-
tify the invention that was the subject of exclusive rights.216 In a system 
of central claiming, the patentee provides examples of the invention 
through detailed descriptions.217 Today’s system of “peripheral claim-
ing” relies on separate patent claims—carefully worded sentences that 
appear at the end of the patent document—to describe the “metes and 
bounds” of the patentee’s rights.218 The claims enumerate a combina-
tion of elements that constitute the patented invention.219 If an accused 
product includes all the elements of a claim, as properly construed, 
that claim is infringed.220 The claims must “particularly point[] out and 
distinctly claim[] the subject matter which the applicant regards as his 
invention.”221 A claim that cannot be understood by persons skilled in 
the art may be rejected, or invalidated, on grounds of indefiniteness.222 
 In the remainder of the patent, known as the “specification,” the 
applicant provides drawings and prose descriptions to satisfy the disclo-
sure requirements of the first paragraph of section 112 of the Patent 
Act.223 Section 112 demands a “written description of the invention, 
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, 
                                                                                                                      
214 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) (describing how the 
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215 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). 
216 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Con-
struction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743, 1746 (2009). 
217 See Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 719, 726–27 
(2009) (explaining that, under a central claiming system, infringement is shown by com-
paring the accused product to several specific examples disclosed in the patent); Collins, 
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which alleged infringing products are compared). 
218 See In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“It is the claims which de-
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219 See Collins, supra note 186, at 501 (explaining that claims “specify the necessary and 
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entee has exclusive rights). 
220 Techsearch, L.L.C. v. Intel Corp., 286 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
221 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 2 (2006), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. 
L. No. 112-29, § 4(c), (e), 125 Stat. 284, 296–97 (2011) (effective Sept. 16, 2012). 
222 Microprocessor Enhancement Corp. v. Tex. Instruments Inc., 520 F.3d 1367, 1374 
(Fed. Cir. 2008). 
223 See 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1 (requiring the specification to contain a written descrip-
tion of the invention). 
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clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art 
. . . to make and use the same.”224 Section 112 also requires the inven-
tor to disclose “the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying 
out his invention.”225 The enablement and best mode requirements are 
a part of the patentee’s “bargain.”226 In exchange for exclusive rights, 
the patentee must teach those skilled in the art how to practice the 
claimed invention without “undue experimentation.”227 The specifica-
tion also plays an important role in interpreting claim language.228 
 A patentable invention must be “useful,”229 and it must fall within 
one of the statutory categories of “process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter.”230 “Abstract ideas” cannot be patented.231 The 
invention must be new in comparison to the prior art,232 and it must 
not have been obvious, when it was made, “to a person having ordinary 
skill in the art.”233 
 To see how these rules of patent law accommodate an actual in-
vention, I will use as an example the apparatus discussed in the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s 2011 decision In re Klein.234 
This invention has the advantage of mechanical simplicity, combined 
with the fractal complexities of a host of alternative embodiments.235 
Section III.A describes the invention and patent application in the Klein 
case.236 Section III.B uses that example to show how the law governing 
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patent claims accommodates the fractal nature of invention.237 Section 
III.C explains the conflict between the enablement requirement of pat-
ent law and the fractal nature of invention.238 Section III.D explains 
how the same conflicts arise in the context of the written description 
requirement.239 Finally, Section III.E discusses how the prohibition on 
issuing patents for “abstract ideas” is particularly discordant with the 
fractal nature of invention.240 
A. A Complex Patent for Simple Technology 
 Arnold Klein’s patent application U.S. 2006/0153000, published 
July 13, 2006, concerns the combination of sugar and water to make 
“nectar” for feeding birds and butterflies.241 Hummingbirds require a 
mixture of one part sugar to four parts water, orioles require one part 
sugar to six parts water, and butterflies prefer a mixture that is one part 
sugar to nine parts water.242 According to Mr. Klein, consumers need a 
simple device for combining sugar and water in the correct ratios.243 
His solution is a mixing container with compartments to measure the 
ingredients in the desired proportions.244 
 The Klein application illustrates a number of distinct embodi-
ments for accomplishing this task.245 One resembles a conventional 
mixing cup, but with straight sides incorporating three sets of vertical 
“rails” into which a divider may be inserted.246 These allow the con-
tainer to be divided into the proportions needed for hummingbird, 
oriole, or butterfly nectar.247 After positioning the divider, the user of 
the device fills the smaller compartment with sugar and the larger with 
water.248 As long as the levels are the same, the ratio will be correct even 
                                                                                                                      
237 See infra notes 287–334 and accompanying text. 
238 See infra notes 335–418 and accompanying text. 
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241 U.S. Patent Application No. 11/363,714 (filed July 13, 2006), at [0003] [hereinafter 
Klein App.], available at http://www.google.com/patents/about/11_363_714_ Convenience_ 
nectar_mixing_and.html?id=SU-YAAAAEBAJ (click “Download PDF”). 
242 Id. at [0007–10]. 
243 Id. at [0006]. 
244 Id. at [0011]. 
245 Id. at [0014–61], figs.1–46. 
246 Id. figs.1–7. 
247 Klein App., supra note 241, at [0062]. 
248 Id. at [0063]. 
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if the container is only partially filled.249 The user then removes the 
divider and mixes the nectar.250 
r of 
ring implement and lid.264 If used as a lid, the divider may include a 
                                                                                                                     
 An alternative embodiment relies on a cylindrical divider attached 
to the center of a round measuring cup.251 Cylinders of different vol-
umes provide the necessary ratios for hummingbird, oriole, or butterfly 
nectar.252 The user fills the cylinder with sugar and the rest of the con-
tainer with water.253 After matching the levels, the user pulls out the 
cylinder, allowing the sugar and water to mix.254 Other variants feature 
a rotating divider that the user can position to measure the proper 
amount of sugar, and then turn further to permit the sugar and water 
to combine.255 A less versatile embodiment consists of a cup with a 
fixed divider, positioned to supply the proportions necessary for only 
one of the nectar recipes.256 The user of this device fills the compart-
ments, screws on a lid, and shakes the container to produce the fin-
ished product.257 Yet another embodiment accomplishes a similar re-
sult with separately molded compartments for sugar and water, rather 
than a single compartment divided by a partition.258 Finally, Klein dis-
closes a measuring cup with a well at the bottom to hold a quantity of 
sugar and a larger space above to accommodate water.259 In this em-
bodiment, the user simply fills the bottom with sugar to the level indi-
cated, and then tops up the container with water.260 The mixing takes 
place as the user pours the water over the sugar.261 The disadvantage of 
this simplest embodiment is that one must make a full containe
nectar each time.262 
 For each of these distinct embodiments, Klein suggests varia-
tions.263 The removable divider may (or may not) be adapted as a stir-
 
249 See id. (requiring the sugar and water to be filled to the same “line-of-sight” in each 
compartment). 
250 Id. at [0064]. 
251 Id. at [0065], figs.8–12. 
252 Id. at [0065]. 
253 Klein App., supra note 241, at [0065]. 
254 Id. 
255 Id. at [0066], figs.13–16. 
256 Id. at [0069], figs.35–42. 
257 Id. at [0069]. 
258 Id. at [0070], figs.43–44. 
259 Klein App., supra note 241, at [0071], figs.45–46. 
260 Id. at [0071]. 
261 Id. 
262 Id. 
263 See infra notes 264–269 and accompanying text. 
264 Klein App., supra note 241, at [0064]. 
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hole that can be closed with an integral plug or a separate plug.265 The 
description of the rotating variant contemplates planar or contoured 
dividers.266 The dividers “may be made of a flexible or semi-flexible ma-
terial and/or may have a reduced cross section at the edges to assist in 
sealing between the container compartments.”267 Figure 42 of the pat-
ent application depicts an alternative lid for the device designed to be 
shaken; this version includes a plug “connected to the lid . . . by an in-
tegrally formed strap.”268 Klein shows the last and simplest embodiment 
as a cylindrical cup, but it “could be made in many other functional 
shapes.”269 
 The specification concludes with the customary warning that even 
the many variations discussed do not encompass the full scope of the 
invention: 
The foregoing description is not intended to be all inclusive 
of the embodiments that a CONVENIENCE NECTAR MIX-
ING AND STORAGE DEVICE may have. The device itself, 
once disclosed, may be configured in a variety of embodi-
ments that operate similarly to those detailed and described 
herein. I desire therefore, that my protection be limited, not 
by the constructions illustrated and described, but only by the 
proper scope of the appended claims.270 
 The application includes twenty-three claims, of which Claims 1, 
12, and 19 are independent claims.271 Claim 1 generally corresponds to 
the moveable divider embodiments.272 The ten dependent claims that 
                                                                                                                      
 
265 Id. 
266 Id. at [0068]. 
267 Id. 
268 Id. at [0069], fig.42. 
269 Id. at [0071]. 
270 Klein App., supra note 241, at [0075]. 
271 See id. at 6, Claims 1–23. 
272 Id. at 6, Claim 1. Claim 1 reads as follows: 
1. A convenience nectar mixing and storage device for use in the preparation 
of sugar-water nectar for feeding hummingbirds, orioles or butterflies, said 
device comprising: 
 a container that is adapted to receive water, 
 engagement means fixed or fitted to said container, 
 a divider adapted to be moveably held by said engagement means for form-
ing a compartment within said container, wherein said compartment has a vol-
ume that is proportionately less than a volume of said container, by a ratio es-
tablished for the formulation of sugar-water for hummingbirds, orioles or 
butterflies, wherein said compartment is adapted to receive sugar, and wherein 
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follow incorporate by reference all of the elements of Claim 1 and add 
one or two additional limitations.273 Claim 2, for example, limits the 
divider to one integrally formed with the container.274 Claim 3 includes 
a means to store the divider when not in use.275 Claim 8 specifies a con-
tainer with a handle and pouring spout.276 Independent Claim 12, and 
its set of dependent claims, generally corresponds to the fixed-divider 
embodiments that are shaken to combine the ingredients.277 Inde-
pendent Claim 19 corresponds to the embodiment in which pouring 
the water into the undivided container serves to mix the water with the 
pre-measured quantity of sugar.278 
 The technology is simple, yet the independent and dependent 
claims only begin to suggest the countless ways in which one could con-
struct what Klein would call a “convenience nectar mixing and storage 
device.” Mapped as a branching fractal, one might begin with the main 
branches of moveable dividers, fixed dividers, and no dividers, repre-
sented in the three independent claims. Each of those could be made 
in many shapes, from many materials, and incorporating any number 
of features—handles, lids, vents, plugs, and more. The dividers could 
slide, tilt, swing, fold, flex, or retract. Piling variation upon variation, 
the coastline of even this modest fractal island is limitless. 
 Although we cannot tell from the application, both ascending and 
descending “cascades” may have played a role in building the nectar 
dispenser fractal to the stage reflected in the claims and disclosure. 
Klein likely had some general ideas about how the apparatus would 
work, and proceeded in “top-down” fashion to work out the details and 
variations. It is equally likely that Klein “backtracked” by reassessing so-
lutions, eliminating unnecessary details, and returning to the big pic-
                                                                                                                      
said divider is moveable from said engagement means allows mixing of said 
sugar and water to occur to provide said sugar-water nectar. 
Id. The “engagement means” element would likely be construed as a means-plus-function 
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275 Id. at 6, Claim 3. 
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277 See id. at 6, Claims 12–18 (requiring a “fixed divider”). 
278 See id. at 6, Claim 19 (requiring that, when water is poured into the second com-
partment, it can mix with the sugar in the first compartment). 
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ture. Perhaps his first thoughts involved only the variation with the 
moveable divider, but on contemplating the advantages of a nectar 
shaken, not stirred, the fixed-divider alternative emerged as an attrac-
tive alternative. Invention is an “iterative process” in which understand-
ing evolves gradually.279 As inventors translate their ideas into concrete 
embodiments—either working prototypes or the detailed disclosures 
required in a patent specification—broad conceptions become particu-
larized.280 On the other hand, the exercise of drafting patent claims 
plays an important role in generalizing inventions. Before committing 
to a claim limitation, the inventor must be sure that it is necessary.281 
Too narrow a conception of how the invention may be implemented 
gives competitors an easy way to avoid the patent.282 
 To recall the Koch island analogy, adding details to a general con-
ception is the equivalent of extending new promontories from an exist-
ing root. If the movable divider embodiment of the nectar-mixing ap-
paratus is one promontory, imagining a planar shape for that moveable 
divider extends a sub-promontory, adapting it as a lid extends a sub-
sub-promontory, and so on. Realizing that the moveable divider need 
not be planar but could be cylindrical is the equivalent of stepping back 
and extending a new promontory, itself subject to branching, in an en-
tirely different direction. Abandoning the idea that the divider has to 
be moveable at all is a further step back, opening up even more possi-
bilities. Generalizing in this fashion is the equivalent of constructing a 
Koch island backwards.283 
                                                                                                                      
 
279 Paley, supra note 130, at 171. 
280 See id. (describing the process of invention as a “journey from idea to concrete real-
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282 See Alan L. Durham, Patent Law Essentials: A Concise Guide 21 (3d ed. 2009) 
(explaining that, because the claim language defines the scope of a patent, using language 
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283 As Jeanne Fromer has observed, an inventor looking to draft an adequate patent 
claim must “think[] beyond the particular creation . . . to abstract principles or patterns 
underlying the creation and a range of potential commercial possibilities.” Fromer, supra 
note 217, at 757. The inventor of a metal doorstop, for example, “will have to think about 
whether doorstops in other materials embody the same concept and whether the inven-
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commercial abstraction” as a cost imposed by our system of peripheral claiming. Id. But 
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 Eventually the inventor seeking a patent must complete the patent 
application, bringing the growth of this fractal to an end as far as the 
claims and disclosure are concerned. As far as the invention itself is 
concerned, the fractal has no end. Further exploration reveals more 
latent possibilities. 
 If a fractal structure like a Koch island is a fair representation of 
the realities of technological progress, the question we must now ask is 
whether the basic rules of patent law are compatible with that struc-
ture. As discussed in the remainder of this Section, a number of persis-
tent controversies in patent law relate to the difficulty of reducing a 
complex network of technological relationships, like those illustrated in 
the Klein application, into the thing known in patent law as “the inven-
tion.” We will consider, in turn, the obstacles raised by fractal invention 
in fixing the scope of the patent,284 in enabling and describing the in-
vention,285 and in avoiding patents to abstract ideas.286 
B. Claiming the Fractal Invention 
 In the case of any patent, there are a number of ways to define 
“the invention.” One is the idea within the contemplation of the inven-
tor. In the context of distinguishing between concepts and concrete 
embodiments, the U.S. Supreme Court, in the 1998 case Pfaff v. Wells 
Electronics, Inc., stressed that “[t]he primary meaning of the word ‘in-
vention’ in the Patent Act unquestionably refers to the inventor’s con-
ception . . . .”287 The Federal Circuit has defined “conception” as the 
formation in the mind of the inventor of “a definite and permanent 
idea of an operative invention, including every feature of the subject 
matter sought to be patented.”288 A second candidate for “the inven-
tion” is the technological advancement disclosed in the patent specifi-
cation. Section 112 of the Patent Act requires the specification to in-
clude “a written description of the invention” and disclosures adequate 
                                                                                                                      
doorstop should consider alternatives. The exercise of reducing an invention to its essen-
tials in order to describe it in a claim may lead the inventor, and eventually the public, to a 
better understanding of the invention. 
284 See infra notes 287–334 and accompanying text. 
285 See infra notes 335–443 and accompanying text. 
286 See infra notes 444–461 and accompanying text. 
287 525 U.S. 55, 60 (1998). 
288 Sewall v. Walters, 21 F.3d 411, 415 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see also Shum v. Intel Corp., 499 
F.3d 1272, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Conception is the formation in the mind of the inven-
tor of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is 
hereafter to be applied in practice.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
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to allow persons skilled in the art “to make and use the same.”289 This 
measure of “the invention” is in keeping with the patentee’s bargain of 
disclosure in exchange for exclusive rights. A third candidate for “the 
invention” is the set of all things that, if unauthorized, infringe the pat-
ent—all things, in other words, that possess each of the elements re-
cited in one patent claim. In the 2005 en banc case Phillips v. AWH 
Corp., the Federal Circuit declared it “a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent 
law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention to which the pat-
entee is entitled the right to exclude.’”290 
 Nothing in the Patent Act suggests that the invention conceived by 
the inventor, described in the specification and claimed in the claims, is 
not one and the same thing. So it should be, if what entitles the pat-
entee to exclude others is having thought of the invention first and dis-
closed it fully in a patent application. 
 The problem is that claims accommodate the fractal nature of in-
vention in ways that contemplation and disclosure cannot. No one can 
completely describe, or fully contemplate, the contours of any portion 
of a fractal. The details reveal themselves to those who look, as they 
look. Nevertheless, one can define, without ambiguity, a portion of a 
fractal in order to distinguish it from the rest. In the case of a Koch is-
land, one can refer to that portion of the island rooted in what begins 
as the uppermost point at the Star of David stage. Defining a portion of 
the irregular Mandelbrot set is more difficult, but software users who 
magnify a portion of the figure by specifying a narrower set of starting 
values do exactly that.291 They cannot not tell what they will see as they 
“zoom in” further, but they can tell what portion of the Mandelbrot set 
they are investigating. One option is simply to circle a portion of a frac-
tal to distinguish the part that lies within. Claims, in similar fashion, 
define a portion of the network of technological advancement, even if 
they do not describe every variation they encompass. 
 Claim 1 of Klein’s application has three elements—a water-receiv-
ing container, an “engagement means” to hold the divider, and a mov-
able divider to form compartments in the container that correspond to 
the correct sugar-water ratios.292 Any one of the infinite variety of nec-
tar-mixing apparatus with those three elements falls within the scope of 
                                                                                                                      
289 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1 (2006), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. 
L. No. 112-29, § 4(c), (e), 125 Stat. 284, 296–97 (2011) (effective Sept. 16, 2012). 
290 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. 
Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
291 See supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text. 
292 Klein App., supra note 241, at 6, Claim 1. 
2012] The Fractal Geometry of Invention 523 
Claim 1.293 Like most claims, Klein’s claim is open ended.294 Because 
the preamble ends with the word “comprising,” nectar-mixing cups that 
have the three recited elements infringe, whether or not they have ad-
ditional elements too.295 To put things in algebraic terms, the claim 
covers the set of all objects that include A, B, and C, regardless of 
whether those objects also include X, Y, or Z. The way claims work 
matches well with the fractal nature of invention. If one promontory of 
Klein’s invention consists of nectar-mixing containers with dividers that 
are (A) movable, (B) planar, and (C) adapted to function as a lid, then 
a claim with those elements (A, B, C) covers that promontory and all of 
its separately indescribable appendages. 
                                                                                                                     
 Difficulties still arise because of the ambiguities of language. Some 
of Klein’s claims refer to a “lid.”296 One can imagine a case in which an 
accused product had a top that only partially covered the contents of 
the container. Klein might call that a “lid” and the accused infringer 
might disagree. The problem here would not arise from the fractal 
complexities of invention, but from the difficulty of using language to 
clearly specify the promontory, or sub-promontory, to which the claims 
refer. When claim language is ambiguous, one can look for assistance to 
the disclosures of the patent specification.297 If Klein always referred to a 
“lid” as a precaution to avoid spills, the ambiguity might be resolved. 
C. The Arlington Dissent 
 Although it is a “bedrock principle” of patent law that the claims— 
not the examples in the specification—determine the scope of the pat-
entee’s right to exclude,298 there remains some controversy about in-
terpreting claims so generously that they exceed the scope of “the in-
vention,” meaning the technology that the inventor actually 
 
293 See Durham, supra note 282, at 21 (explaining that a claim covers any object that 
includes each element described in the claim). 
294 See Peter P. Merges et al., Intellectual Property in the New Technological 
Age 299 (5th ed. 2010) (stating that most claims use open-ended language, so that they 
can encompass infringing products that include additional elements not anticipated by the 
patentee). 
295 See Free Motion Fitness, Inc. v. Cybex Int’l, Inc., 423 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (holding that an infringing product cannot avoid the scope of a claim by adding 
additional elements if the claim contains an open phrase like “comprising” ); Collins, supra 
note 186, at 530–31 (indicating that use of the word “comprising” in a claim will allow that 
claim to encompass products with additional elements). 
296 Klein App., supra note 241, at 6, Claims 4–6, 12, 23. 
297 See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315–16 (explaining how courts may “rely heavily on the 
written description for guidance as to the meaning of the claims”). 
298 Id. at 1312. 
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contemplated and disclosed. The 2011 Federal Circuit case of Arlington 
Industries, Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc. illustrates this tension.299 
 The invention in Arlington concerned an electrical connector to 
plug a cable into a junction box.300 Plugging in a cable is usually a two-
hand job—one hand to hold the cable and the other to screw in a 
threaded lock nut.301 The patent covered an improved push-on con-
nector that is more easily installed.302 The claim element in dispute 
called for a “spring metal adapter.”303 The patent specification depicted 
the adapter as a metal cylinder with a gap or split along its length.304 
The issue before the court was whether the claim element “spring met-
al adapter” should be limited to the split-ring configuration.305 Al-
though the district court found that, without a split, an adapter could 
not “spring” as the claim required,306 the Federal Circuit concluded 
that “spring metal” referred simply to the material from which the 
adapter is made.307 
                                                                                                                     
 The court observed that “[w]hile the drawings of the adapter con-
sistently depict an incomplete circle, drawings in a patent need not il-
lustrate the full scope of the invention.”308 Based on a variety of clues, 
including references in the specification to “spring steel” as a typical 
material for the adapter, the court concluded that a “spring metal 
adapter” must be made from “spring metal,” but it need not be split as 
depicted in the patent specification.309 The specification, the Federal 
Circuit ruled, “does not delimit the right to exclude.”310 Delimiting the 
right to exclude is the function of the claims alone.311 
 
299 See 632 F.3d 1246, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (interpreting the claims to cover only what the patentees disclosed in the spec-
ification, as that indicates the full scope of what they “invented”). Although Judge Alan 
Lourie’s opinion in Arlington was a concurrence in part and dissent in part, this Article 
focuses on the dissenting portion of his opinion and, therefore, refers to his opinion as a 
“dissent” in the main text. 
300 Id. at 1249 (majority opinion). 
301 See id. (stating that the prior art design required two hands to connect). 
302 Id. 
303 Id. at 1248, 1250. 
304 See id. at 1251 (reproducing an illustration from the patent). 
305 Arlington, 632 F.3d at 1248–49. 
306 Id. at 1252. 
307 See id. at 1253–56 (interpreting the language of the claim to require that the adapter 
be made of spring metal). 
308 Id. at 1254. 
309 Id. at 1253–56. 
310 Id. at 1256. 
311 Arlington, 632 F.3d at 1256. 
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 Judge Alan Lourie dissented from the majority’s claim construc-
tion.312 In his view, the specification is “the heart of the patent,”313 and 
it serves a primary role in interpreting claim language because “the 
specification describes what the inventors invented.”314 In “colloquial 
terms,” he wrote, “‘you should get what you disclose.’”315 For Judge 
Lourie, “the invention” is whatever the patentee “contemplated.”316 In 
this case, the inventors disclosed split-ring adapters and no other 
kind.317 Based on this evidence, “the inventors . . . contemplated that 
their invention consisted only of spring metal adapters with an opening 
that results from not forming a complete circle.”318 Though Judge 
Lourie agreed that the claims measure the patentee’s right to exclude, 
he would put more emphasis on construing claims to reflect “what the 
inventors meant when they used the language they did.”319 “The bot-
tom line of claim construction,” he concluded, is that “the claims 
should not mean more than what the specification indicates, in one way 
or another, the inventor invented.”320 
 The proper role of the specification in interpreting claim language 
has always been difficult to articulate. According to black-letter law, one 
                                                                                                                      
312 See id. at 1257 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concurring 
with the majority’s ruling regarding one of the patents at issue, but dissenting in regard to 




316 See id. at 1257–58 (lamenting the use of patents to block innovations by competi-
tors). Judge Lourie stated: 
Unfortunately, the nature of our adversary system often causes . . . patents to 
be asserted against someone engaged in activity not contemplated by the in-
ventors as part of their invention. So the patent is used as a business weapon 
against such parties, and litigation counsel attempt to fit a square peg into a 
round hole, or, in other words, to fit into the claim language what the inven-
tors never contemplated as a part of their invention. 
Id. 
317 Arlington, 632 F.3d at 1258 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
318 Id. 
319 Id. 
320 Id. The majority rejected Judge Lourie’s “‘you should get what you disclose’” re-
mark as “devalu[ing] the importance of claim language in delimiting the scope of legal 
protection.” Id. at 1255–56 n.2 (majority opinion). A patent specification “‘discloses and 
teaches’” only the claims “‘define and circumscribe.’” Id. (quoting Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. 
Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc)); infra notes 321–324 and 
accompanying text.  In other “colloquial term[s],” the majority wrote, “‘the name of the game 
is the claim.’” Id. (quoting Giles S. Rich, The Extent of the Protection and Interpretation of 
Claims—American Perspectives, 21 Int’l Rev. Indus. Prop. & Copyright L. 497, 499, 501 
(1990)). 
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can use the specification to interpret claim language,321 but one cannot 
import into the claims limitations that appear only in the specifica-
tion.322 In practice, just a “fine line” separates the two.323 That the 
specification in Arlington depicts split-ring adapters is no reason to in-
troduce “split-ring adapter” as a claim limitation; it might, however, be a 
reason to interpret “spring metal adapter” in a limited fashion.324 What 
is interesting about Arlington is not that Judge Lourie’s interpretation of 
“spring metal adapter” differed from that of the majority, but rather 
that Judge Lourie stressed a unitary invention—one invention contem-
plated, disclosed, and successfully claimed.325 The majority, in contrast, 
distinguished between the disclosed invention and the scope of the in-
ventor’s exclusive rights.326 
 The fractal nature of invention supports the majority’s view. A 
claim can define a portion of the branching structure and establish ex-
clusive rights to all that it contains, but the inventor cannot contem-
plate, or disclose, every variation within its scope. The fractal properties 
of multiplicity and latency make that impossible.327 Suppose that the 
inventors in Arlington were limited to split-ring adapters because that 
was the only kind of “spring metal adapter” they contemplated. There 
                                                                                                                      
321 See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1321 (specification is “the single best guide to the meaning 
of a disputed term”). 
322 See id. at 1323 (“[A]lthough the specification often describes very specific embodi-
ments of the invention, we have repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those 
embodiments.”); Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(“[L]imitations from the specification are not to be read into the claims . . . .”). 
323 Arlington, 632 F.3d at 1255. 
324 See id. (explaining the difference between reading a claim in light of the specifica-
tion and importing a limitation from the specification into a claim). 
325 See id. at 1257 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (indicating 
that the specification describes what the patentee invented and that the claims must corre-
spond to what has been invented and disclosed). 
326 See id. at 1255 & n.2 (majority opinion) (contrasting reading a claim in light of the 
specification with importing a limitation from the specification into a claim). 
327 One scholar discusses the seeming paradox of claims that must be fixed in meaning 
as of their filing date, but that “grow” to encompass after-arising infringing technology, 
and finds no contradiction. Collins, supra note 186, at 513. A coarse-grained description of 
the contents of the claim (leaving out details that make the after-arising technology differ-
ent) need not change, even as the fine-grained details of the things themselves evolve. Id. 
at 518–20. Within the context of the fractal structure of invention, one could say that the 
promontory distinguished by the presence of the claim elements remains the same prom-
ontory, even as the variations within that promontory—the wrinkles on the coastline—
reveal themselves over time. One would not say that a mathematical fractal, like the Man-
delbrot set, “grows”; what grows is our understanding as we peer more closely at its perime-
ter. That is one way to look at invention. In any event, so long as the role of claims is to 
distinguish a portion of the fractal from the rest, they can embrace technologies unknown 
to the inventor without changing their meaning. 
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must be numerous varieties of split-ring adapters employing different 
shapes and materials. If the inventors “contemplated” only the one il-
lustrated in the patent specification, would their claim be further lim-
ited? 
 Limiting claims to what the inventor “contemplated” leads to con-
fusion. An inventor can contemplate finished embodiments, but a pat-
ent cannot be limited to those without reducing its value dramati-
cally.328 An inventor can contemplate a general idea—like the general 
idea of a push-on cable connector—but contemplation at that level was 
not what Judge Lourie had in mind. The issue is how far up or down 
the fractal chain, to what level of specificity, the inventor’s contempla-
tion must go. An inventor knows there are always other ways to do the 
same thing. That is the reason for cautionary language, like that found 
in the Klein application, warning that the disclosed embodiments are 
merely examples.329 At what level of detail must the inventor contem-
plate those alternatives in order to claim them? 
 The simplest way to deal with this issue is to ignore it, as far as 
claim interpretation is concerned. If a claim is simply a warning to oth-
ers of the territory that belongs to the patentee, the question is how the 
language of the claim would be understood by persons skilled in the 
art. What the inventor contemplated, as revealed in the disclosures of 
the specification, is relevant to how one should interpret claim lan-
guage that would otherwise be ambiguous. The issue, however, is ulti-
mately one of understanding what the claim says, not ensuring balance 
in the patent bargain—in other words, that “you . . . get what you dis-
close.” This was the view of the Arlington majority and, in spite of his 
rhetoric, even Judge Lourie ultimately resorted to what is simply a dif-
ferent interpretation of the phrase “spring metal adapter.” If the inven-
tor believed that a split-ring design was the only alternative, and the 
disclosure showed that to be the case, then a narrow interpretation 
would be justified.330 
                                                                                                                      
 
328 See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732 (2002) 
(explaining that the doctrine of equivalents in patent law prevents claim avoidance by 
“‘unimportant and insubstantial changes and substitutions.’” (quoting Graver Tank & Mfg. 
Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950))). In the context of copyright, Judge 
Learned Hand warned against rights limited to the text itself—rights that plagiarists could 
easily avoid through “immaterial variations.” Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 
119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). 
329 See supra note 270 and accompanying text. 
330 Some scholars have advocated a re-emphasis of central claiming, so that courts set-
ting the boundaries of a patent can concentrate on “what the patentee actually invented,” 
rather than the meaning of terminology invented by lawyers. Burk & Lemley, supra note 
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 It is a principle of our patent system to expect disclosure in ex-
change for rights, and to award those rights based on invention.331 If we 
had a patent system in which there was no such bargain, claim interpre-
tation would be the only relevant consideration. Patentees could be 
assigned their exclusive territories not in exchange for disclosure, or 
even in recognition of their discoveries, but simply to ensure that those 
territories are managed efficiently. Edmund Kitch’s “prospect theory” 
of patent law suggests that such a system would be rational.332 As dis-
cussed above, this system would adequately accommodate the fractal 
nature of invention.333 The fractal nature of invention, however, creates 
problems for the “bargain” envisioned by U.S. patent law through the 
discord of what can be contemplated, disclosed, and claimed. Judge 
Lourie’s concerns, therefore, cannot be ignored. Recently, the Federal 
                                                                                                                      
216, at 1787–88. In a system of central claiming, courts can be flexible in setting patent 
boundaries, taking into account the significance of the invention and how much it differs 
from the prior art. See id. at 1746 (describing the court’s discretion under a central claim-
ing system). Judge Lourie would probably approve. A central claiming approach might 
avoid the inherent difficulties of describing an invention in claim language, but it would 
bring into the infringement inquiry all of the problems that stem from the fractal struc-
ture of technological progress. Based on the examples and disclosure presented in the 
specification, one would have to determine how far up the fractal network the patentee 
can justifiably stake a claim. 
Other disciplines of intellectual property follow a similar approach. Id. at 1774. In copy-
right, the text itself serves as the “core” of the author’s rights; the boundaries depend on how 
different an accused work can be while remaining “substantially similar” in expression. Id. 
Patents have one advantage over copyrights—the existence of the disclosure, in which the 
inventor can provide information relevant to the significance of the invention and its place in 
the art. Nevertheless, one cannot be optimistic that a central claiming approach would make 
the boundaries of patents easier to discern. If anything, the fractal structure of invention 
suggests that a peripheral system is a more efficient way to set off a domain of exclusive 
rights. One can define a portion of a Koch island much more easily by circling it (a rough 
analog of a peripheral claim) than by describing representative examples on the infinitely 
complex periphery. A system of central claiming would confront, in the realm of infringe-
ment, the problem of patentees claiming broader exclusive rights than their contributions to 
the art can support. As discussed below, courts today generally address this through the en-
ablement and written description requirements, and that is likely to remain the case for the 
foreseeable future. See infra notes 331–443 and accompanying text. 
331 See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 150–51 (“The federal patent system . . . embodies a 
carefully crafted bargain for encouraging the creation and disclosure of new, useful, and 
nonobvious advances in technology and design in return for the exclusive right to practice 
the invention for a period of years.”). 
332 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & Econ. 
265, 276 (1977) (“[A] patent ‘prospect’ increases the efficiency with which investment in 
innovation can be managed.”). Prospect theory imagines a legal system in which exclusive 
rights to explore certain defined areas of technology are granted to potential inventors 
prior to making their discoveries. Id. 
333 See supra notes 325–330 and accompanying text. 
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Circuit has dealt with those concerns primarily through the enable-
ment and written description requirements.334 
D. Enabling the Fractal Invention 
 Section 112 of the Patent Act requires disclosures in the patent 
specification sufficient to enable any person skilled in the art to make 
and use the invention without “undue experimentation.”335 If Klein’s 
“invention” encompassed all nectar-mixing devices within the scope of 
his claims, and the Klein application left out some information that 
persons skilled in the art would need to complete any nectar-mixing 
apparatus (a gap that could not be filled with knowledge already pos-
sessed by persons skilled in the art), the specification would be non-
enabling.336 A more interesting situation arises if Klein’s disclosure en-
ables the construction of some, but not all, of the nectar-mixing devices 
within the scope of his claims. Klein admits that his invention may be 
practiced in ways that are not disclosed.337 The measuring cups, for ex-
ample, may be made in an infinite variety of shapes, not all of which 
are, or could be, described. Some variations would not require “undue 
experimentation” to achieve, but others undoubtedly would. One 
merely has to imagine mixing devices within the scope of Klein’s open-
ended claims, but made from materials unknown to science. 
 In a series of recent cases, in which Judge Lourie played a promi-
nent role, the Federal Circuit held that, when a claim encompasses 
more than one variation of the same invention, a disclosure that en-
ables only some variations may be inadequate.338 The breadth of the 
disclosure has to match the breadth of the claims.339 On its face, that is 
a principle in keeping with the “bargain model” of the patent system. 
In practice, the fractal properties of invention make that principle dif-
ficult to apply. 
                                                                                                                      
334 See infra notes 335–443 and accompanying text. 
335 Sitrick, 516 F.3d at 999; see also 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1 (2006), amended by Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 4(c), (e), 125 Stat. 284, 296–97 (2011) 
(effective Sept. 16, 2012) (“The specification shall contain a written description of the 
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, con-
cise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, . . . to 
make and use the same . . . .”). 
336 See Sitrick, 516 F.3d at 999 (requiring that a patentee disclose enough information 
to enable someone skilled in the art to make or use it without undue experimentation). 
337 See supra note 270 and accompanying text. 
338 See infra notes 340–377 and accompanying text. 
339 See infra notes 377–400 and accompanying text. 
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1. Partial Enablement 
 The first of those recent cases was the 2003 Federal Circuit case AK 
Steel Corp. v. Sollac, in which the invention concerned hot-dipped, alumi-
num-coated stainless steel.340 The patent specification explained that 
Type 1 aluminum coatings, which are composed of about ten percent 
silicon, do not adhere well to the steel substrate.341 The inventors, there-
fore, recommended a purer Type 2 aluminum coating.342 As originally 
filed, the claims were limited to a coating “consisting essentially of alu-
minum,” but the inventors later sought and obtained broader claims.343 
In an opinion authored by Judge Lourie, the Federal Circuit deter-
mined that the broader claims covered both Type 1 and Type 2 alumi-
num.344 The issue then was whether the specification enabled the 
claimed invention.345 
 Although the specification enabled the use of Type 2 aluminum, 
“as part of the quid pro quo of the patent bargain, the applicant’s specifi-
cation must enable one of ordinary skill in the art to practice the full 
scope of the claimed invention.”346 When the claims cover a range of 
variations, the specification must supply “reasonable enablement of the 
scope of the range.”347 This does not mean that the specification “must 
necessarily describe how to make and use every possible variant of the 
claimed invention.”348 The knowledge already possessed by persons 
skilled in the art, plus routine experimentation, “can often fill gaps, 
interpolate between embodiments, and perhaps even extrapolate be-
yond the disclosed embodiments, depending upon the predictability of 
the art.”349 In this case, no such “gap filling” could make up for the fail-
ure of the specification to enable the use of Type 1 aluminum.350 The 
specification was not merely silent on the matter, it “clearly and strongly 
warn[ed]” that Type 1 aluminum should be avoided.351 Because the 
                                                                                                                      
340 344 F.3d 1234, 1236, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that the specification failed to 
enable some of the claimed subject matter). 
341 Id. 
342 Id. at 1236–37. 
343 Id. at 1237. 
344 Id. at 1241–43. 
345 Id. at 1243. 




350 See id. (finding the specification inadequate). 
351 Id. 
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specification did not enable “a significant portion of the subject matter 
encompassed by the contested claims,” those claims were invalid.352 
 A similar case decided by the Federal Circuit in 2004, Liebel-
Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., involved a device used to inject fluids dur-
ing medical procedures.353 The embodiments disclosed in the patents 
included pressure jackets around the syringes to contain the pressur-
ized fluids.354 Although none of the asserted claims referred to a pres-
sure jacket, the district court interpreted the claims to require one.355 
The Federal Circuit reversed.356 During prosecution, the patentee had 
removed references to pressure jackets from the claims in order to cov-
er jacketless devices like the defendant’s.357 To restore pressure jackets 
to the claims by implication would be to ignore the patentee’s clearly 
expressed intentions.358 
 On remand, the district court held the newly interpreted claims 
invalid for lack of enablement and, when the case returned to the Fed-
eral Circuit, that finding was affirmed.359 In an opinion authored by 
Judge Lourie, the court remarked on “the irony of this situation”; hav-
ing won a broad claim construction that did not require pressure jack-
ets, the patentee “then had to show that such a claim was fully enabled, 
a challenge it could not meet.”360 The specification warned that injec-
tors without pressure jackets would be expensive and impractical for 
disposable syringes.361 All of the illustrations depicted injectors with 
pressure jackets.362 Contradicting the argument that pressure jackets 
could be eliminated without undue experimentation, the inventors 
admitted that they had failed in their own attempts to build injectors 
without pressure jackets before abandoning the effort as “‘too risky.’”363 
As in AK Steel, the specification failed to provide “‘reasonable enable-
ment of the scope of the range’” —the “range” here including injectors 
with and without pressure jackets.364 
                                                                                                                      
352 AK Steel, 344 F.3d at 1245. 
353 Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 900 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
354 Id. at 901. 
355 Id. 
356 Id. at 903. 
357 Id. at 909. 
358 Id. 
359 Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc. (Liebel-Flarsheim II ), 481 F.3d 1371, 1375, 1378 
(Fed. Cir. 2007). 
360 Id. at 1380. “The motto, ‘beware of what one asks for,’ might be applicable here.” Id. 
361 Id. at 1379. 
362 Id. 
363 Id. 
364 Id. at 1380 (quoting AK Steel, 344 F.3d at 1244). 
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 In Automotive Technologies International, Inc. v. BMW of North America, 
Inc., a Federal Circuit case decided in 2007, Judge Lourie authored a 
third opinion focusing on the scope of enablement.365 The invention 
here was a side-impact sensor for activating an airbag in the event of a 
vehicle collision.366 Prior art sensors deployed the airbag when crushed 
or deformed.367 The sensor in this case detected the acceleration of a 
movable mass within the sensor housing.368 With infringement in 
mind, the patentee successfully argued in favor of a broad claim con-
struction that included both mechanical switch assemblies, like those 
depicted in the patent specification, and electronic switch assem-
blies.369 As in Leibel-Flarsheim, the unintended result was a claim held 
invalid for lack of enablement.370 
                                                                                                                     
 In this case, the patent did not discourage the use of electronic 
switches.371 In fact, it included a “conceptional view” of an electronic 
sensor assembly, including a sensor mass and housing,372 and it stated 
that acceleration of the mass could be detected “by a variety of tech-
nologies using, for example, optics, resistance change, capacitance 
change, or magnetic reluctance change.”373 Nevertheless, the patent 
described the electronic switch in such a cursory fashion—the “concep-
tual view” omitting any disclosure of structure or circuitry—that a per-
son of ordinary skill in the art could not have made one without undue 
experimentation.374 The patentee’s claim that acceleration sensors rep-
resented a “breakthrough” for side-impact airbag deployment rein-
forced that impression.375 Once again, the patent failed to provide “‘rea-
 
 
365 501 F.3d 1274, 1276, 1282, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding claims invalid for lack of 
enablement). 
366 Id. at 1276–77. 
367 Id. at 1277. 
368 Id. at 1277–78. 
369 Id. at 1280, 1283. 
370 See id. (affirming the lower court’s holding that the claim, as broadly construed, was 
invalid for lack of enablement); Liebel-Flarsheim II, 481 F.3d at 1380 (noting that, ironically, 
the court was persuaded by the patentee to interpret the claim broadly, which forced it to 
invalidate the claim for lack of enablement). 
371 See Auto. Techs., 501 F.3d at 1278 (describing the portion of the specification that 
discloses the use of an electronic sensor instead of a mechanical one). 
372 Id. 
373 Id. 
374 Id. at 1282–83. 
375 See id. at 1283 (stating that, since this technology is a breakthrough, a more thor-
ough explanation of it would be required to enable its use by one skilled in the art). “Giv-
en that side impact sensing was a new field and that there were no electronic sensors in 
existence that would detect side impact crashes, it was especially important for the specifi-
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sonable enablement of the scope of the [claimed] range.’”376 Electronic 
sensors, the court concluded, are “not just another known species of a 
genus consisting of sensors, but are a distinctly different sensor com-
pared with the well-enabled mechanical side impact sensor that is fully 
discussed in the specification.”377 
2. “Reasonable” Enablement 
 The fractal properties of invention would not intrude if it were 
enough to enable a single embodiment within the claimed range. Al-
though the path of invention may be tortuous, an inventor can achieve 
a completed embodiment and can disclose to others how to make and 
use that embodiment without undue experimentation. The Klein ap-
plication appears to enable several variants.378 On the other hand, if 
one must enable enough embodiments to match the “range” covered 
by the claim, the fractal nature of invention makes matters much more 
difficult. Thanks to the branching structure of invention, even the sim-
plest idea leads to a vast array of variations. These cannot all be dis-
closed in the specification, nor can one entirely “fill in the gaps” by re-
lying on the knowledge of those skilled in the art and the fruits of 
routine experimentation.379 Unless the Klein application discloses the 
ultimate nectar-mixing device, there will always be room for significant 
                                                                                                                      
cation to discuss how an electronic sensor would operate . . . and to provide details of its 
construction.” Id. at 1284. 
376 Id. at 1285 (quoting Liebel-Flarsheim II, 481 F.3d at 1380). 
377 Auto. Techs., 501 F.3d at 1285. As proof that this approach to enablement is not the 
sole province of Judge Lourie, a Federal Circuit panel in which he was not included issued 
a similar opinion. See Sitrick, 516 F.3d at 999–1000, 1002–03 (holding a claim invalid when 
partially, but not fully, enabled). In Sitrick v. Dreamworks, the technology involved inserting 
a user’s image into a preexisting video. Id. at 995. The claims encompassed inserting im-
ages in both videogames and movies, but the specification only enabled the former. Id. at 
999–1000. Altering a movie involved an entirely different set of problems, and because the 
specification did not teach how to solve them without undue experimentation, it failed to 
enable the full scope of the invention. Id. 
378 See Klein App., supra note 241, at [0062–75] (describing many variations on the 
“convenience nectar mixing and storage device(s)”). 
379 Some scholars identify the impossibility of enabling all variations within the scope 
of a claim as a shortcoming of peripheral claiming system. Burk & Lemley, supra note 216, 
at 1764–65. I would go further. The multiplicity of embodiments that cannot be enabled is 
a consequence of the fractal structure of invention and would persist even in a system of 
central claiming. The only way to avoid the problem would be to define the invention as 
whatever the patentee enables. In such a system, improvements, because they are im-
provements, would not infringe. This would be very different than our current system and 
might provide inadequate incentives to develop and disclose basic inventions. 
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changes, even within the boundaries set by the claims. According to 
Petroski, “There can be no such thing as a ‘perfected’ artifact . . . .”380 
 Consider the sensors discussed in Automotive Technologies.381 The 
court calls the mechanical sensor “well-enabled” and “fully dis-
cussed.”382 The patent does disclose, in great detail, one variety of me-
chanical sensor, in which the forces of a collision cause a “flapper” to 
move until it closes an electrical circuit and initiates airbag deploy-
ment.383 The specification also teaches that other mechanical sensors, 
including spring-mass sensors and viscously damped sensors, may be 
substituted.384 Many such mechanical sensors might be within the reach 
of a person skilled in the art without undue experimentation, but it is 
difficult to believe that all of them would be. Suppose someone later 
devised a mechanical sensor based on the movement of an electrically 
conductive fluid. A fluid-based sensor might be a great innovation, wor-
thy of a patent of its own. Would the failure to enable it make the pat-
ent in Automotive Technologies invalid? Or, if the patentee had fully dis-
closed one version of an electronic sensor, would the failure to disclose 
others—based on laser interferometry, radar, sonar, or some other ex-
otic technology—have mattered? 
 The answer must lie in what the court means by “reasonable en-
ablement” of the scope of the claimed range of embodiments.385 One 
possibility is to say that “reasonable” enablement means enabling a cer-
tain proportion of all of the variations that fall within the scope of the 
claim. Yet the fractal properties of invention suggest that limitless varia-
tions fall within the scope of most patent claims, frustrating any analysis 
based on a percentage.386 Unless, that is, most or all of those countless 
variations are based on differences so minor that persons of ordinary 
                                                                                                                      
380 Petroski, supra note 164, at 22. 
381 See 501 F.3d at 1277–78, 1285 (discussing electronic and mechanical sensors). 
382 Id. at 1285. 
383 Id. at 1277–78. 
384 Id. at 1278. 
385 See, e.g., AK Steel, 344 F.3d at 1244 (requiring “reasonable enablement” of the scope 
of the claimed range). 
386 Jeffrey Lefstin has argued that “[a]ll patent claims are of infinite scope,” Lefstin, 
supra note 2, at 1168, and that “every claim is in the end a genus claim.” Id. at 1206 (cita-
tion omitted). He attributes this to the “ontological nature of patent claims” as signifiers of 
the characteristics shared by the “set of entities” that possess the enumerated claim ele-
ments. Id. at 1168. In fact, it is not only the characteristics of peripheral claims that pro-
duce that boundless variety; it arises also from the fractal qualities of invention. Lefstin 
concludes that “[d]ue to the infinite scope of patent claims, a patentee certainly need not, 
and in most instances cannot, enable every embodiment falling within the ‘full scope’ of 
the claims.” Id. at 1175. 
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skill in the art could practice them without undue experimentation. 
Although there might be inventions that simple and that devoid of the 
potential for non-obvious improvement, they must be rare. As previ-
ously discussed, even the paper clip has been the basis for continued 
innovation, including patentable innovation.387 
 It may be helpful to return to the image of invention as a continu-
ously branching, ever-expanding Koch island.388 The claim in Automo-
tive Technologies defines a portion of that island, populated by side-
impact crash sensors including the elements set forth in the claim—a 
housing, a mounting assembly, a moveable mass within the housing, 
and a mechanism to detect the motion of the mass when subject to the 
forces of a collision.389 The last element, as interpreted by the court, 
includes mechanical and electronic sensors,390 so we might consider 
each a major branch of the claimed peninsula. Each of those branches 
may be subdivided. The mechanical branch may be subdivided into 
inertially damped sensors, spring-mass sensors, viscously damped sen-
sors, and whatever other variations are possible. The inertially damped 
subdivision could be divided further into branches for flapper designs, 
as disclosed in the patent, and, presumably, a host of alternative de-
signs. Returning to the electronic sensor branch, it could be subdivided 
into branches that employ optics, resistance change, capacitance 
change, magnetic reluctance change, and other variants not discussed 
in the patent, including radar, sonar, and laser interferometry. The 
subdivisions go on and on. The patentee cannot teach or even con-
template all of the embodiments on the perimeter, yet the patentee 
must supply the disclosure expected in exchange for exclusive rights. 
 What the Federal Circuit seems to expect is that no major branches 
be devoid of any enabled embodiments. If the disclosure does not en-
able one to build, without undue experimentation, an electronic crash 
sensor based on laser interferometry, the enabling disclosure may still 
be “reasonably” complete. But failure to enable any electronic sensor is 
an omission of the necessary quid pro quo, as is the failure to enable 
                                                                                                                      
387 See supra notes 162–180 and accompanying text. Perhaps one could argue that vari-
ations significant enough to be patented do not have to be enabled because those could 
not be enabled without further acts of invention. But it is precisely those variations that 
must be disclosed, because in these instances one cannot resort to the “gap-filling”of rou-
tine experimentation and the knowledge already possessed by those skilled in the art. See 
Sitrick, 516 F.3d at 999 (requiring that a patentee disclose enough information to enable 
someone skilled in the art to make or use it without undue experimentation). 
388 See supra notes 6–8, 130–133 and accompanying text. 
389 See 501 F.3d at 1277 (recounting the elements of the claim). 
390 Id. at 1278–79. 
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any jacketless fluid injector. The question, then, is how we can distin-
guish a major branch of the claimed invention from a minor one. If we 
began the breakdown of the crash sensor invention with embodiments 
that use laser interferometry and embodiments that do not, then the 
failure to enable any of the former could be invalidating. 
 So far the Federal Circuit has relied on the patentee’s characteriza-
tion of the invention. In AK Steel, the specification suggested a funda-
mental distinction between Type 1 and Type 2 aluminum.391 Type 1 
aluminum was said to be unsuitable, and the claims of the patent ini-
tially avoided it.392 Hence the alteration of the claims to include Type 1 
aluminum looks like a major expansion of the territory subject to the 
claim. Similarly, in Liebel-Flarsheim the patent specification discouraged 
the omission of pressure jackets as impractical, and the claims, initially, 
were limited accordingly.393 This, and the failure of the inventors to 
devise their own jacketless injector, suggests a basic dichotomy between 
jacketed and unjacketed designs. Automotive Technologies is another mat-
ter. Here the specification did not teach away from electronic sensors, 
but tried to embrace them.394 Yet the patentee called attention to the 
distinction by separately illustrating an electronic sensor, and by leaving 
out so much detail that this portion of the disclosure stands in sharp 
contrast to the rest.395 The electronic sensor seems important to the 
inventors but beyond their grasp.396 
 One wonders what the court would have done if the patent had 
made no reference to an electronic sensor at all. Is it self-evident that 
an electronic sensor is a “distinctly different” embodiment that must be 
enabled?397 Even if an electronic sensor is an inherently superior alter-
native to a mechanical sensor, the same is true of any number of vari-
ants that cannot be enabled because they have not yet been invented. A 
basic tenet of patent law is that a product innovative enough to receive 
its own patent may still infringe another, if the new product is merely a 
                                                                                                                      
391 344 F.3d at 1236–37. 
392 Id. 
393 481 F.3d at 1374, 1379. 
394 501 F.3d at 1277–78 (noting that the district court agreed with the patentee that the 
claim could cover both mechanical and electronic sensors). 
395 Id. at 1284. 
396 See id. at 1283–85 (noting that the patentee described the use of an electronic sen-
sor as a “breakthrough,” but did not provide enough details of this new technology to al-
low someone skilled in the art to make or use it). 
397 See id. at 1285 (describing electronic sensors as “distinctly different” from mechani-
cal ones and requiring that they be separately enabled). 
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(non-obvious) species of a broadly claimed genus.398 That basic tenet 
would mean nothing if the genus patent were always invalid for failing 
to enable the species. Suppose the Liebel-Flarsheim patent included pres-
sure jackets in the illustrated embodiments, but never referred to them 
in the claims or discussed them further in the specification. Suppose 
also that the inventors had never tried to develop a jacketless injector 
themselves. The omission of a pressure jacket in the accused product 
would have no bearing on infringement, however great an advance-
ment it might represent, because it would not be an element of the 
claim.399 And it is far from certain that enablement would be an issue, 
any more than it would be an issue if the accused infringers happened 
to manufacture their syringe from an advanced material of their own 
devising. 
 If one adheres to the bargain model of patent law, the breadth of 
the enabling disclosure should match the breadth of the claim. Other-
wise, the patentee receives more than bargained for. The problem will 
be applying that principle when the patentee did not clearly indicate, 
and failed to enable, a “major branch” of the claimed invention. A ma-
jor branch should be one from which many subbranches depend. But 
the fractal properties of invention complicate such distinctions. If the 
network of variations is self-similar, then there is no scale for distin-
guishing a major branch from a minor one.400 Every branch can be the 
root of subbranches without limit, some that are accessible through 
routine experimentation, and many more that are not. Hence, the en-
abling disclosure of every patent is, from a certain perspective, infi-
nitely lacking. 
3. Variations Beyond “the Invention” 
 The “best mode” inquiry, which is beset by similar difficulties, sug-
gests a slightly different approach. As a part of the patent bargain, the 
specification must disclose the best mode of practicing the claimed in-
                                                                                                                      
398 See Siemens Med. Solutions USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc., 637 
F.3d 1269, 1278–83 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (explaining how a separately patented product may be 
held to infringe another); Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 
1569, 1580–81 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (explaining that the holder of a specific patent may not 
practice his or her own invention without a license from the holder of a broader patent 
that encompasses it (quoting Herman v. Youngstown Car Mfg. Co., 191 F. 579, 584–85 (6th 
Cir. 1911))). 
399 See Durham, supra note 282, at 150 (stating that “infringement is not avoided by 
adding things that are not described in the claim,” or by incorporating improvements to 
the product, provided that the infringing product contains “all elements” of the claim). 
400 See supra notes 91–100, 203–209 and accompanying text. 
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vention known to the inventor.401 If, before the filing date, the inventor 
designed a product embodying the invention, but omitted some infor-
mation about that product from the application, a potential best mode 
violation has occurred.402 Yet a patent application cannot, realistically, 
disclose everything about any product, including everything the inventor 
considered “best.” The best mode inquiry must be kept within bounds 
by treating only some product choices as “modes of practicing the in-
vention.” 
 In 1991, in Wahl Instruments, Inc. v. Acvious, Inc., the Federal Circuit 
discussed the dilemma of a patent applicant who had already devel-
oped a product.403 The invention concerned an immersible egg-timer 
with a layer of temperature-sensitive color-changing dye.404 The detail 
that the patentee failed to disclose was the use of a manufacturing 
technique known as “embedment molding.”405 The court determined 
that embedment molding was “no more than a routine manufacturing 
choice,” well-known in the art and chosen only because of cost.406 Al-
though the inventor had thought embedment molding “best” for his 
product, it was not a choice that had to be disclosed in the patent: 
Any process of manufacture requires the selection of specific 
steps and materials over others. The best mode does not nec-
essarily cover each of these selections. To so hold would turn a 
patent specification into a detailed production schedule, 
which is not its function. Moreover, a requirement for routine 
details to be disclosed because they were selected as the “best” 
for manufacturing or fabrication would lay a trap for patent-
ees whenever a device has been made prior to filing for the 
                                                                                                                      
401 See 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1 (2006), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 
Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 4(c), (e), 125 Stat. 284, 296–97 (2011) (effective Sept. 16, 2012) 
(stating the specification “shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of 
carrying out [an] invention”); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1209–10 
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (describing the best-mode disclosure as part of the “quid pro quo of the 
patent grant”). 
402 See Bayer AG v. Schein Pharm. Inc., 301 F.3d 1306, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting 
that courts have held the best-mode requirement violated by the “failure to disclose a pre-
ferred embodiment, or else failure to disclose a preference that materially affected making 
or using the invention”). Although the recent patent reform legislation removed best 
mode non-disclosure as grounds for holding a patent invalid, 35 U.S.C. § 112 still demands 
that the inventor set forth the best mode. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 
112-29, § 15(a), 125 Stat. 284, 328 (2011) (effective Sept. 16, 2011). 
403 950 F.2d 1575, 1577–78 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
404 Id. 
405 Id. at 1578. 
406 Id. at 1580–81. 
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patent. The inventor would merely have to be interrogated 
with increasing specificity as to steps or material selected as 
“best” to make the device. A fortiori, he could hardly say the 
choice is not what he thought was “best” in some way. Thus, at 
the point he would testify respecting a step or material or 
source or detail which is not in the patent, a failure to disclose 
the best mode would, ipso facto, be established.407 
 An inventor who produces a commercial embodiment ventures 
down the fractal path, making a series of choices of increasing detail. 
Some choices are made for “non-‘best-mode’ reason[s],” such as the 
availability of materials or a prior relationship with a supplier.408 They 
may have nothing to do with making the invention work better. Em-
bedment molding was such a choice because it “did not affect and was 
not thought to affect how [the] invention worked.”409 Consequently, it 
“clearly fell outside the scope of the invention.”410 
 Enablement is a question of the range of disclosure, so what makes 
the invention work better is a less useful metric for what is “outside the 
scope of the invention.” On the other hand, a variation of a variation of 
a variation may seem, at some point, too remote from the claimed in-
vention to be a part of it any longer. Suppose that someone used a new-
ly discovered, scratch-resistant plastic to make a nectar-mixing appara-
tus of the sort claimed in the Klein application. Although Klein did not 
enable a device made from that material, he might argue that his in-
vention was about mixing nectar, not avoiding scratches. This non-
enabled variation may be so far from Klein’s contribution to the art that 
it is no longer relevant to his invention. 
 Unfortunately, in the enablement context there is no easy way to 
distinguish a variation that is part of the invention from one that is not. 
Suppose that the inventors in Liebel-Flarsheim had recommended shat-
terproof plastic rather than breakable glass for their syringe, but later a 
competitor developed a tough variety of glass that could be substituted. 
Would failure to enable glass syringes invalidate the patent? The pat-
entee might argue that a new variety of glass is an entirely separate in-
vention. On the other hand, finding a way to dispense with a pressure 
jacket might be thought a separate invention too. These remote varia-
                                                                                                                      
407 Id. at 1581. 
408 Id. 
409 Wahl Instruments, 950 F.2d at 1581. 
410 Id. 
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tions, like the major branches of a claimed invention, are not self-
defining. 
 When the patentees themselves do not signal the presence of a 
fundamental and non-enabled variation (and patentees, at this point, 
should be careful about what they volunteer), courts may begin by fo-
cusing on the problem solved by the claimed invention. The Klein ap-
plication is about mixing nectar, so the failure to enable a device that 
resists scratches does not seem unreasonable in relation to what Klein 
claims as his invention. The fractal nature of invention, however, sug-
gests that there are, inevitably, countless non-enabled variations of 
Klein’s invention that are very much about mixing nectar. How courts 
will deal with those situations as they move forward is difficult to predict. 
4. Backtracking by Omission 
 One approach may be to distinguish between non-enabled addi-
tions and omissions. Imagine an open-ended claim to the combination 
A, B, C. The combination could be diagrammed as a portion of a frac-
tal network, the first branch of which divides A from ¬ A (meaning not 
A). From the A branch extend two subbranches: A, B (A combined with 
B) and A, ¬ B (A combined with anything but B). From A, B extend two 
further branches: A, B, C, and A, B, ¬ C. Because adding to the claimed 
combination does not avoid infringement, the claim A, B, C reads on 
every variant A, B, C, D, including some varieties of D that were not en-
abled.411 That type of non-enablement is unavoidable. Suppose, how-
ever, that all of the embodiments enabled by the patent applicant in-
clude elements A, B, and C. No enabled embodiment is to be found on 
the A, B, ¬ C portion of the fractal, either through the applicant’s dis-
closure or through what a person of ordinary skill could achieve with-
out undue experimentation. If the applicant claimed A, B (encompass-
ing A, B, C and A, B, ¬ C), one could conclude that the scope of the 
enablement did not match the scope of the claim. 
 Claiming A, B in this instance would represent the applicant back-
tracking from the enabled invention—moving inland from the coast-
line, if we continue the Koch island metaphor—by omitting something 
(namely, C) from the claimed invention. Backtracking of this sort is a 
normal part of technological development. Klein, for example, may 
well have begun with the moveable-divider variant of his nectar-mixing 
device, only to realize that a device without such a divider could be use-
                                                                                                                      
411 See Durham, supra note 282, at 150. 
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ful too. But Klein enabled variants without moveable dividers, so there 
is no reason he should not claim them. Our hypothetical inventor, 
however, did not enable any combination without C, so a court may be 
justified in rejecting the claim to A, B alone.412 
 Judge Lourie would argue that this is exactly the situation pre-
sented in the three cases previously discussed. The claim in AK Steel 
omitted the Type 2 aluminum essential to the applicant’s process.413 
The claim in Liebel-Flarsheim omitted the pressure jacket that all of the 
inventors’ syringes possessed.414 The claim in Automotive Technologies 
omitted the mechanical sensor.415 In Arlington as well, the inventor 
omitted a limitation to the split-ring adapter that was the only variant 
contemplated or disclosed.416 In each case, the inventor laid claim to a 
branch of the fractal devoid of any enabled embodiment, and therefore 
beyond the scope of what had really been invented. 
 But there are some difficulties with this analysis. Suppose our hy-
pothetical inventor did enable one embodiment on the A, B, ¬ C 
branch (a variant we will call A, B, X) but failed to enable another 
(which we will call A, B, Y). Having enabled something on both the A, B, 
C and the A, B, ¬ C branches, we might conclude that the inventor is 
entitled to the A, B claim that encompasses both. But there is still a 
subbranch of the fractal (A, B, Y and all of its subsidiary variants) for 
which there are no enabled embodiments. Logically, this inventor 
should have two specific claims (A, B, C and A, B, X), rather than a 
general claim to A, B. By omitting C or X as a claim limitation, the in-
ventor has generalized the invention in a manner that the enabling dis-
closure cannot support. The problem with this conclusion is that it 
would invalidate most patent claims. Because of the endless branching 
of invention, most patent claims encompass a branch, such as A, B, Y, 
                                                                                                                      
412 See Arlington, 632 F.3d at 1257–58 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (stating that claims should not cover embodiments that were not invented by the 
patentees and described in their application). 
413 See 344 F.3d at 1237–38 (reproducing the claims, which could cover Type 1 or Type 
2 aluminum). 
414 See 481 F.3d at 1373–74 (recounting an exemplary claim and stating that the claims 
did not explicitly require the presence of pressure jackets). 
415 See 501 F.3d at 1277 (reproducing Claim 1 that does not indicate that the sensor 
must be mechanical). 
416 See 632 F.3d at 1251–52 (reproducing Claim 1 that does not indicate that the adapt-
er must have a split ring). 
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that is not specifically contemplated, disclosed, or enabled in any em-
bodiment.417 
 Suppose, for example, that the claims in Liebel-Flarshiem had been 
limited to injectors with pressure jackets, and that the single design il-
lustrated in the specification included such a jacket, which we will call 
jacket X. Let us further suppose that pressure jackets are not the “per-
fected artifact” to which Petroski refers,418 so another inventor eventu-
ally develops an alternative jacket Y. The inventors were correct to 
claim only injectors with pressure jackets, but if they failed to specify 
model X jackets, their claims are still invalid. The inventors could be 
safe only by adding claim limitation upon claim limitation until there is 
no embodiment within the scope of the claim that is non-enabled—an 
objective that could rarely be achieved. Although it is a valid point that 
backtracking from the enabled embodiments can lead to unsupport-
able claims, a rule that can be rigorously applied seems impossible. We 
still must distinguish, somehow, between major and minor omissions. 
E. Describing the Fractal Invention 
 A patent specification must provide, in addition to an enabling 
disclosure, a “written description” of the invention.419 The description 
requirement ensures a match between the claimed invention and the 
invention disclosed in the patent application.420 Although it may be 
most useful when claims have changed during prosecution, the descrip-
tion requirement has been used, like the enablement requirement, to 
invalidate genus claims that are inadequately supported by the species 
detailed in the patent specification.421 The standard is whether the 
specification “reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the in-
ventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing 
date.”422 The fractal qualities of invention complicate application of the 
                                                                                                                      
417 See Lefstin, supra note 2, at 1175 (“Due to the infinite scope of patent claims, a pat-
entee certainly need not, and in most instances cannot, enable every embodiment falling 
within the ‘full scope’ of the claims.”). 
418 See Petroski, supra note 164, at 22 (asserting that there can be no “‘perfected’ arti-
fact,” as “the form of made things is always subject to change”). 
419 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1 (2006), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. 
L. No. 112-29, § 4(c), (e), 125 Stat. 284, 296–97 (2011) (effective Sept. 16, 2012). 
420 Durham, supra note 282, at 91. 
421 See, e.g., In re Curtis, 354 F.3d 1347, 1352–53 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that the writ-
ten description of one species failed to support a genus claim to friction-enhancing coat-
ings for dental floss). 
422 Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d at 1351 (citations omitted). 
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description requirement in the same way they complicate application of 
the enablement requirement. 
 Boston Scientific Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, a case decided by the 
Federal Circuit in 2011, provides a recent illustration.423 The patents 
concerned drug-eluting arterial stents that prevent blockages from re-
turning after a balloon angioplasty—an effect known as restenosis.424 
The claims covered the use of the known drug rapamycin or analogs of 
rapamycin.425 The patent specifications disclosed no example of a ra-
pamycin analog, and admitted that research had not yet revealed the 
precise mechanism that made rapamycin effective.426 
 A written description of a genus—like the genus of rapamycin ana-
logs— “requires the disclosure of either a representative number of 
species falling within the scope of the genus or structural features 
common to the members of the genus so that one of skill in the art can 
‘visualize or recognize’ the members of the genus.”427 The universe of 
compounds structurally similar to rapamycin is “potentially limitless,”428 
and even minor changes might render such chemicals ineffective sub-
stitutes.429 Although the number of species that must be disclosed 
“‘changes with each invention’” and “‘changes with progress in a 
field,’”430 in the absence of any example of a rapamycin analog, or any 
discussion of their attributes other than the ability to substitute for ra-
pamycin, the disclosures here could not demonstrate possession of the 
claimed genus.431 The claims covered “tens of thousands of possible . . . 
analogs,” and the specification provided “no guidance at all . . . as to 
how to properly identify or choose” those chemicals that could substi-
tute for rapamycin.432 In sum, “[t]he patent laws do not reward an in-
ventor’s invitation to other researchers to discover which of the thou-
sands of . . . analogs of rapamycin could conceivably work in a drug-
eluting stent.”433 
                                                                                                                      
423 See 647 F.3d 1353, 1368–69 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding a claim to the use of analogs 
of rapamycin invalid under the written description requirement when no such analogs 
were disclosed). 
424 Id. at 1356. 
425 Id. at 1357. 
426 Id. at 1358–59. 
427 Id. at 1363 (quoting Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1350). 
428 Id. at 1364. 
429 See Bos. Scientific, 647 F.3d at 1364 (noting that minor structural differences in such 
analogs “may have significant and unpredictable effects on functionality”). 
430 Id. at 1363 (quoting Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351). 
431 Id. at 1369. 
432 Id. at 1365. 
433 Id. at 1367. 
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 The inventors in Boston Scientific knew that one chemical, rapamy-
cin, prevented restenosis, and they foresaw that structurally similar 
chemicals, yet to be identified, would do the same.434 In order to have a 
patent that would not be easily avoided, they claimed the genus of ra-
pamycin analogs.435 If arterial stents were a fractal island, we could im-
agine its structure as follows: drug eluting stents are one peninsula; 
from that depends a sub-peninsula of stents that use chemicals struc-
turally similar to rapamycin; and a portion of that sub-peninsula covers 
rapamycin itself. Like many inventors, the inventors in Boston Scientific 
tried to generalize what they had discovered—taking a step back, just as 
the inventors in Liebel-Flarsheim stepped back from pressure jackets and 
the inventors in Automotive Technologies stepped back from mechanical 
sensors. The question is whether such stepping back, and the conse-
quent broadening of the patent, can be justified. Did the inventors 
“possess” the broader invention? 
 As Judge Arthur Gajarsa points out in his concurring opinion to 
Boston Scientific, this could have been addressed through the enable-
ment requirement.436 The inventors identified only one chemical (ra-
pamycin itself) in the genus of chemicals that are structurally similar to 
rapamycin and effective to prevent restenosis.437 In light of the unpre-
dictability of the art, discovery of other members of the genus would 
require undue experimentation.438 The patent’s disclosures, accord-
ingly, did not provide reasonable enablement of the scope of the 
claimed range.439 Approaching the same issue through the description 
requirement only changes things slightly. The inventors “possessed” the 
genus in the sense that they could imagine it, but not in the sense that 
they could identify whether a particular chemical fell within the ge-
nus.440 If the inventors had been able to provide a few more examples 
of chemicals like rapamycin, then the question would be whether those 
                                                                                                                      
434 See id. at 1364 (finding that the specification demonstrated that the patentee was 
“in possession” of rapamycin but not its analogs). 
435 See Bos. Scientific, 647 F.3d at 1357 (stating that the claims covered rapamycin and its 
analogs). 
436 Id. at 1369 (Gajarsa, J., concurring). 
437 See id. at 1369–70 (finding that none of the analogs were shown to be effective). 
438 Id. 
439 Id. at 1370. 
440 See id. at 1363 (majority opinion) (agreeing with the defendant that nothing in the 
patents show that the “inventors possessed drug-eluting stents employing the broad genus 
of . . . analogs,” as they did not give any examples or identifying features of such analogs). 
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examples constitute a “representative number of species.”441 If the frac-
tal here is one that branches endlessly, then we have the familiar prob-
lem of determining how many species of the genus are enough to be 
“representative.” 
 The description requirement often arises in cases involving the 
chemical or biological arts, which may differ from the mechanical arts 
that we have so far discussed.442 The structural elements necessary to 
produce a chemical effect may be so specific that, once those structures 
are identified, everything else falls into place.443 With further research, 
the inventors in Boston Scientific might have been able to describe, by 
their structural attributes, every molecule that is an analog of rapamy-
cin. Or they might have revealed those structural attributes through 
examples. Such completeness cannot be expected in a field like crash 
sensors, in which the alternatives are probably inexhaustible. On the 
other hand, even in the chemical arts one can step back far enough 
that no description, other than one based on function alone, can in-
clude all of the subject matter claimed, or demonstrate “possession” in 
any but the most abstract sense. For example, the inventors in Boston 
Scientific could have claimed all drugs that prevent restenosis, no matter 
how they work. The issue remains this: how much of the fractal island 
can an inventor claim, based on the discovery, enablement, and “pos-
session” of just a portion of that endlessly branching and ever-evolving 
structure? If the fractal model is an accurate one, no answer is likely to 
prove satisfying. 
F. Abstract Ideas 
 The hypothetical claim that embraces all means of preventing 
restenosis recalls another area of patent law in which the fractal nature 
of invention plays a role—the long-standing prohibition on patenting 
“abstract ideas.”444 Courts have used the abstract ideas exception to de-
                                                                                                                      
441 See Bos. Scientific, 647 F.3d at 1363 (stating that a genus may be adequately described 
by providing a representative number of examples or identifying structural features of 
members of the genus). 
442 See Merges et al., supra note 294, at 201–03 (discussing several cases in which the 
written description requirement was applied to biotechnology). 
443 See Bos. Scientific, 647 F.3d at 1370 (Gajarsa, J., concurring) (suggesting that “[o]nce 
rapamycin’s structure was known, scientists could hypothesize that useful analogs could 
potentially be created by changing parts of that molecule”). 
444 See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 (noting that abstract ideas have long been held not pat-
entable). 
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ny patents to intangible or non-technological inventions,445 and also to 
address claims broader than the patentee’s contribution to the art.446 
Perhaps the most famous example of the latter is the venerable U.S. 
Supreme Court case from 1854, O’Reilly v. Morse, which invalidated one 
claim of Samuel Morse’s patent on the telegraph.447 Claim 8 of Morse’s 
patent extended to any use of electromagnetism to convey printed mes-
sages.448 The court acknowledged the value of Morse’s telegraph and 
his entitlement to a patent,449 but decided that Claim 8 went too far 
beyond the means of communication that Morse had discovered. 
If this claim can be maintained, it matters not by what process 
or machinery the result is accomplished. For aught that we 
now know some future inventor, in the onward march of sci-
ence, may discover a mode of writing or printing at a distance 
by means of the electric or galvanic current, without using any 
part of the process or combination set forth in the plaintiff’s 
specification. His invention may be less complicated—less li-
able to get out of order—less expensive in construction, and 
in its operation. But yet if it is covered by this patent the in-
                                                                                                                      
445 See Alan L. Durham, The Paradox of “Abstract Ideas,” 2011 Utah L. Rev. (forthcoming 
2012); see also Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Reformation and 
Harm, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 905, 951–64 (2010) (discussing early and recent examples of cases in 
which inventions that lacked “tactile engagement” were denied patents under the abstract 
ideas doctrine). 
446 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1575, 
1642 (2003) (“The rule against patenting abstract ideas, while couched in terms of pat-
entable subject matter, is really a judicial effort to restrict the permissible scope of patents 
and to channel patent protection towards finished products.”). 
447 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 63 (1853). 
448 Id. at 112. Claim 8 of Morse’s patent stated: 
I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery or parts of machin-
ery described in the foregoing specification and claims; the essence of my in-
vention being the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current, 
which I call electro-magnetism, however developed for marking or printing 
intelligible characters, signs, or letters, at any distances, being a new applica-
tion of that power of which I claim to be the first inventor or discoverer. 
Id. 
449 Id. at 117. The court noted: 
[I]t is the high praise of Professor Morse, that he has been able, by a new 
combination of known powers, of which electro-magnetism is one, to discover 
a method by which intelligible marks or signs may be printed at a distance. 
And for the method or process thus discovered, he is entitled to a patent. 
Id. 
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ventor could not use it, nor the public have the benefit of it 
without the permission of this patentee.450 
 According to Morse, a patentee who exploits natural forces, like 
electromagnetism, for practical ends must “specif[y] the means he us-
es” and claim only those.451 Yet there are other cases, of similar vintage, 
cautioning against limiting inventors too stringently to a particular 
mechanism.452 The Morse opinion itself refers to Neilson et al. v. Harford, 
an English case from 1841, which upheld the validity of a patent for a 
furnace design.453 Neilson improved the efficiency of combustion by 
preheating the air in a separate vessel.454 Even though his patent did 
not specify the form of the vessel or the manner of heating it, the Eng-
lish court held Neilson’s patent valid.455 The Supreme Court in Morse 
approved of that result, because Neilson’s invention did not depend on 
the characteristics of the vessel.456 Any heated vessel would produce the 
desired effect “in greater or lesser degree.”457 In contrast, success in 
transmitting messages by electromagnetism depended on the apparatus 
employed.458 
 All patent claims are, by their nature, abstract. A mousetrap claim 
does not describe a particular mousetrap, but the class of all mouse-
traps possessing the enumerated characteristics. Abstraction is also an 
aspect of invention. Velcro could not have been developed if de Mestral 
had not abstracted from the particulars of the cocklebur the inventive 
concept of hook-and-loop fasteners. Consequently, the simple admoni-
tion that “abstract ideas” cannot be patented leaves much to be desired. 
Abstractness is, for all patent claims, a matter of degree. As I have ar-
gued elsewhere, the best way to measure whether a claim is too abstract 
is in comparison to the teachings of the patent disclosure, as one does 
in the context of the enablement and description requirements.459 In-
deed, although Morse has been called the origin of the abstract ideas 
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exception to patentable subject matter,460 the Federal Circuit has ob-
served that it might be interpreted as a written description case.461 As a 
tool to confront overbreadth, the abstract ideas prohibition is as un-
necessary as it is misleading. 
 So long as the patent system demands a quid pro quo of disclosure 
in exchange for exclusive rights, patents that claim more of the fractal 
island than the inventor’s teachings can justify should be rejected. Per-
haps a claim like Morse’s Claim 8 is in a special category because no 
amount of disclosure could ever match the scope of the exclusive rights 
that he sought. When applying the abstract ideas prohibition, however, 
courts should bear in mind the limitations that face all patent appli-
cants. A claim “abstracts” certain aspects of the invention (claim ele-
ments A, B, C) because that is how applicants describe the portion of 
the fractal to which they assert exclusive rights—just as one might de-
scribe a portion of a Koch island by reference to its roots, rather than 
its infinitely complex perimeter. In most cases, the patent will not, and 
cannot, disclose all variations within the scope of the claims. There are 
too many branches for that to be possible. All claims represent abstract 
ideas. Therefore, the best tool for ensuring an adequate quid pro quo 
is not the yes-or-no inquiry of patentable subject matter, but the more 
nuanced analysis of section 112’s enablement and written description 
requirements. 
Conclusion 
 Patent law is rife with difficult questions: What is “the invention”? 
How broadly may it be claimed? How much disclosure is needed to en-
able it, or demonstrate that the inventor “possessed” it? When is an idea 
too “abstract” to be patented? Although recognizing the fractal nature 
of invention does not supply easy answers to these questions, it suggests 
why the answers are so elusive. Technological progress is the product of 
continuous growth and limitless complexity. In some respects, trying to 
fix an invention in a verbal summary and a teaching disclosure is as fu-
tile as trying to draw a portion of a Koch island; in either case, one can 
only sketch the outlines and appeal to the imagination. Fortunately, 
patent law is a practical discipline, not a mathematical one. Perfection 
is unnecessary, so long as the result promotes the progress of the useful 
arts as the framers of the Constitution intended. If courts recognize the 
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461 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1346 n.4. 
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fractal properties of invention, the compromises they reach will at least 
be better informed, more honest, and perhaps more effective in serv-
ing their ultimate goal. 
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